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INTRODUCTION 
OCTRINE and scholarship tend to assume that Congress establish-
es national policy and mediates state-federal relations. Although 
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commentators have long recognized the profound significance of the 
administrative state, they continue to describe agencies as elaborating 
legislative choices and to cast Congress as the principal broker of state 
interests in Washington. Some give the legislature an even more promi-
nent role, insisting that contemporary federalism itself comes by the 
“grace of Congress.”1 
These days, however, very little comes by the grace of Congress. As 
partisan polarization impedes new legislation, existing statutes grow at-
tenuated from domestic policy concerns. Executive action is critical. Yet 
this executive action is not the autarchic presidential improvisation pop-
ular accounts suggest, nor is it the state-preemptive agency action schol-
ars of administrative federalism study. Instead, today’s executive action 
entails collaboration among state and federal officials, reliance on state 
as well as federal initiative, and the contestation that follows from mul-
tiple sites of power. Multifaceted executive interactions, not congres-
sional decisions, shape both national policy and our federalism. 
This Article proposes a different way of thinking about contemporary 
American governance, looking to an established foreign practice. Execu-
tive federalism—“processes of intergovernmental negotiation that are 
dominated by the executives of the different governments within the 
federal system”2—is pervasive in parliamentary federations, such as 
Canada, Australia, and the European Union. Given the American separa-
tion of powers arrangement, executive federalism has been thought ab-
sent, even “impossible,” in the United States.3 But the partisan dynamics 
that have gridlocked Congress and empowered both federal and state ex-
ecutives have generated a distinctive American variant. 
Viewing American law and politics through the lens of executive fed-
eralism brings four key features into focus. First, executives have be-
come dominant actors at both the state and federal levels. They formu-
late policy and manage intergovernmental relations. Although executive 
negotiations have shaped American federalism at least since the New 
 
1 Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 Yale L.J. 1996, 1999 (2014); see id. at 
1998 (“[F]ederalism now comes from federal statutes. . . . Federalism today is something 
that mostly comes—and goes—at Congress’s pleasure. It is a question, and feature, of feder-
al statutory design.” (emphasis omitted)). 
2 Ronald L. Watts, Executive Federalism: A Comparative Analysis 3 (1989).  3 Martha A. Field, The Differing Federalisms of Canada and the United States, 55 L. & 
Contemp. Probs. 107, 118 n.33 (1992); see, e.g., Watts, supra note 2, at 7; Herman Bakvis & 
Douglas Brown, Policy Coordination in Federal Systems: Comparing Intergovernmental 
Processes and Outcomes in Canada and the United States, 40 Publius 484, 488 (2010). 
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Deal, Congress once superintended them. Today, from healthcare to ma-
rijuana to climate change, federal and state executives negotiate without 
Congress. Second, there is a substantial degree of mutuality among these 
executives, much more than is suggested by the federal government’s 
legal supremacy. Federal and state actors turn to state law as well as fed-
eral law to further their agendas; sometimes this amplifies conflict, but it 
also enables officials to find paths to compromise. Third, national policy 
frequently comes to look different across the states as a result of execu-
tive negotiations. Some states more strongly press a position shared by 
the federal executive, while others offer competing views. Finally, hori-
zontal relationships among the states are critical in setting national poli-
cy, as the federal executive builds on interstate agreements and reshapes 
them in turn. 
In addition to describing executive federalism in the United States, 
this Article offers a qualified defense. The practice enhances the federal 
executive’s capacity to act amid congressional dysfunction, but so too 
does it entail the multiplicity and pushback endemic to state-federal rela-
tions. Perhaps most notably, it facilitates a form of governance suited to 
polarization: state-differentiated national policy. Today, for example, 
marijuana is effectively legal as a matter of federal law in some states 
but not others; the states are adopting different approaches to climate 
change regulation in coordination with a federal agency; and they are 
expanding Medicaid in a variety of ways unforeseen by Congress. Exec-
utive federalism is yielding in the United States something loosely akin 
to Canada’s checkerboard federalism or Europe’s differentiated integra-
tion.4 
Executive federalism also offers a needed forum for bipartisan com-
promise. Rather than require a grand deal that satisfies an aggregate na-
tional body, executive federalism unfolds through many negotiations 
among disaggregated political actors. These discrete conversations facil-
itate intraparty difference at the same time as the process of implementa-
tion further complicates, and may attenuate, partisan commitments. 
Moreover, the most criticized aspect of executive federalism abroad—its 
 
4 See generally Alkuin Kölliker, Flexibility and European Unification: The Logic of Dif-
ferentiated Integration (2006) (describing differentiated integration in the European Union); 
Alexander Stubb, Negotiating Flexibility in the European Union (2002) (same); Herman 
Bakvis, Checkerboard Federalism? Labour Market Development Policy in Canada, in Cana-
dian Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness, and Legitimacy 197, 197 (Herman Bakvis & 
Grace Skogstad eds., 2002) (discussing checkerboard federalism in Canada). 
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relative lack of transparency—may be an asset. In recent years, scholars 
of American politics have assailed transparency as an impediment to ne-
gotiation, but they have not yet looked beyond Congress to consider less 
visible venues for national policymaking.5 
Any approach to national policymaking that leaves Congress on the 
sidelines has a clear strike against it as a matter of democratic represen-
tation, and the deficiencies of executive federalism in this respect are 
apparent. Yet, as recent work in political theory shows, representation is 
a more complicated process than the law’s standard delegate models 
suggest.6 Because executive federalism generates different variants of 
national policy, it may stimulate deliberation grounded in concrete acts 
rather than abstract speech. Interactions between states and the federal 
government also raise the possibility that national representation may be 
advanced outside of Washington and that constituencies may transcend 
territorial designations. 
If executive federalism is a potentially valuable practice, so too is it 
vulnerable. Challenges raising a host of doctrinal objections are already 
flooding the courts, and more can be expected. Courts reviewing these 
claims should revisit certain assumptions. In considering the intersection 
of federalism and Chevron,7 for instance, judges and scholars have asked 
only whether federalism concerns should diminish judicial deference.8 
But federalism might instead be deference enhancing insofar as federal 
agencies are incorporating and enabling state policymaking. This argu-
ment aligns with recent advocacy for greater deference to agencies in 
 
5 See, e.g., Sarah A. Binder & Frances E. Lee, Making Deals in Congress, in Solutions to 
Political Polarization in America 240, 252–53 (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015) [hereinafter Po-
litical Polarization]; Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, 
and the Decline of American Government, 124 Yale L.J. 804, 847–49 (2014); Mark E. War-
ren & Jane Mansbridge, Deliberative Negotiation, in Am. Political Sci. Ass’n, Negotiating 
Agreement in Politics 86, 106–12 (Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo Martin eds., 2013). 
6 See, e.g., Nadia Urbinati, Representative Democracy: Principles and Geneaology (2006); 
Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (2000); Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Repre-
sentation, 97 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 515 (2003). 7 Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 8 See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 (2013); Gonzales v. Oregon, 
546 U.S. 243, 275 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001); Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdic-
tion in Administrative Law, 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 229–35; Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron 
and Preemption, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 737, 741–43 (2004); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative 
Law as the New Federalism, 57 Duke L.J. 2023, 2027 (2008); Ernest A. Young, Executive 
Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 869, 870–71 (2008). 
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times of political polarization,9 but it conditions such leeway on state in-
volvement rather than unilateral federal action. Courts might particularly 
respect agency views that state law is not preempted. 
Executive federalism also raises questions about Compact Clause 
doctrine given new forms of interstate collaboration. Even as the Su-
preme Court has generously permitted states to enter into agreements 
without federal approval, it has framed the relevant issue as protecting 
“federal supremacy.”10 Partisan dynamics put pressure on this unified 
conception of the federal government. As recent developments suggest, 
the important doctrinal fights going forward are unlikely to be waged in 
terms of state versus federal power; they will instead concern the rela-
tive authority of Congress and the President, acting in conjunction with 
certain states. Federal executive involvement in interstate agreements 
should make courts look more, not less, favorably on such agreements. 
In charting the emergence of executive federalism in the United 
States, this Article seeks to identify a distinctive approach to national 
policymaking and to offer a qualified defense of the phenomenon. After 
Part I describes some effects of partisan politics on American govern-
ment, Part II argues that existing models of legislative and administra-
tive federalism do not capture important contemporary dynamics. Part 
III suggests that a foreign practice long believed impossible in the Unit-
ed States, executive federalism, gives us greater purchase, and it illus-
trates the claim with discussions of healthcare, marijuana, climate 
change, and education policy. Moving from the descriptive to the nor-
mative, Part IV evaluates the American variant of executive federalism 
in terms of governance, compromise, and representation. Part V con-
cludes with a few doctrinal suggestions. 
I. POLARIZATION AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
Three trends have converged to shape American government today: 
the rise of the administrative state, the demise of dual federalism, and 
the resurgence of intense partisan polarization. The first two develop-
ments occurred hand-in-hand as the New Deal, in particular, expanded 
federal regulation into areas traditionally governed by the states. Even as 
a growing administrative apparatus enhanced federal executive power, 
 
9 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1, 70–81 (2014); Cass R. Sunstein, Partyism, 2015 U. Chi. Legal F. 1, 16.  10 E.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 460 (1978). 
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overlapping state-federal jurisdiction required collaboration and negotia-
tion among state and federal actors. The executive branch thus became 
at once more powerful and obliged to work with the states.11 
For most of the twentieth century, however, both national policymak-
ing and the federal arrangement were superintended by Congress. Con-
gress’s vitality as the administrative state expanded was bound up in 
mid-twentieth-century partisan politics: The Democratic and Republican 
parties were internally diverse, loose confederations that facilitated 
lawmaking and oversight attentive to state as well as federal interests.12 
Today’s Democratic and Republican parties are instead sharply polar-
ized.13 The range of issues on which the parties compete has expanded at 
the same time as partisan intensity has grown, the parties have become 
vehicles for rival interest group agendas, and partisanship and ideology 
have become closely aligned.14 As national political currents have over-
whelmed regional partisan difference, partisanship has come to trump 
institutional affiliations with respect to both the separation of powers 
and federalism.15 
This Part describes how partisan polarization amplifies certain dy-
namics inherent in the rise of the administrative state and demise of dual 
 
11 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 
Colum. L. Rev. 459 (2012). 12 See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federal-
ism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215 (2000). 
13 E.g., John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? A Second Look (2011); Nolan McCarty et al., Po-
larized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (2006); Barbara Sinclair, Party 
Wars: Polarization and the Politics of National Party Making 5 (2006); Jeffrey M. Stonecash 
et al., Diverging Parties: Social Change, Realignment, and Party Polarization (2003). 14 See Alan I. Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center 7 (2010); Michael J. Barber & Nolan 
McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization, in Political Polarization, supra note 5, at 
15, 15; Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and 
Nominations in American Politics, 10 Persp. on Pol. 571, 571 (2012); Geoffrey C. Layman 
et al., Party Polarization in American Politics: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences, 9 
Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 83, 84 (2006).  
 Polarization has been asymmetric—Republicans have moved further to the right than 
Democrats have to the left—and there remain intraparty divisions, such as between Tea Par-
ty and more “establishment” Republicans, but each party has become more ideologically co-
hesive. See Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, It’s Even Worse Than It Looks: How 
the American Constitutional System Colluded with the New Politics of Extremism 3–103 
(2012); Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Confronting Asymmetric Polarization, in Political 
Polarization, supra note 5, at 59, 59. 
15 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1077 (2014); Daryl 
J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2311 
(2006). 
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federalism. As Republicans and Democrats are unable to work together 
in Congress, gridlock increases the already considerable pressure on the 
federal executive to act on its own. At the same time, polarization makes 
cogovernance with the states more attractive, and more feasible, than 
truly independent federal executive action. Partisanship generates a vari-
ety of alliances among state and federal executive branch actors, who 
seize on states’ potential as fora for national politics. In focusing on po-
larization, I therefore do not intend to suggest that executive federalism 
follows only from polarization, nor do I mean to argue that the rise of 
the administrative state, the demise of dual federalism, and the rise of 
polarization are independent, rather than interdependent, phenomena. 
Rather, I explore polarization as the most recent in a series of develop-
ments, one that offers a critical, if also necessarily incomplete, frame for 
understanding contemporary American governance. 
A. The Federal Government 
The consequences of political polarization have been most obvious—
and most severe—for Congress. Indeed, a rare point of agreement in to-
day’s political culture is that Congress has become dysfunctional. The 
news is full of gridlock, failed attempts at deal making, and falls off 
cliffs designed to force action.16 Americans nationwide give Congress 
approval ratings in the teens, as commentators bemoan its ability to ad-
dress critical problems or even to perform basic functions.17 
Scholars broadly attribute congressional dysfunction to the mapping 
of polarized parties onto political structures designed without partisan-
ship in mind.18 Many suggest that our parties are now the ideological, 
 
16 See, e.g., Josh Hicks, Over the Fiscal Cliff: Day One, Wash. Post (Jan. 1, 2013), http://w
ww.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/01/01/over-the-fiscal-cliff-day-one 
[https://perma.cc/M7ZW-8K77]; Jennifer Steinhauer, Mitch McConnell Makes Changes, but 
Senate Gridlock Remains, N.Y. Times (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/2
1/us/politics/mitch-mcconnell-makes-changes-but-senate-gridlock-remains.html [https://per
ma.cc/SC3N-BV4M]. 
17 See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, Introduction, in Political Polarization, supra note 5, at 3, 7–
8; Congress and the Public, Gallup, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1600/congress-public.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/HEF3-ZQEN]. 18 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco: Why the American Political System 
Is Dysfunctional, Closing Keynote Address (Nov. 13, 2013), in 94 B.U. L. Rev. 1159, 1165 
(2014); Sarah Binder, The Dysfunctional Congress, 18 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 85, 95 (2015); 
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unified, oppositional parties of a parliamentary system, a useful if only 
partially illuminating comparison.19 Such parties need not hinder gov-
ernance, but ours is not a parliamentary government. Instead, the consti-
tutional separation of powers creates multiple veto points across institu-
tions, while practices such as the filibuster add further barriers within 
Congress.20 Although the ways in which such structures complicate the 
project of governance have long been apparent,21 they were surmounta-
ble obstacles in an era of loose-knit parties when shifting coalitions 
formed across party lines. For a time it seemed parties themselves might 
provide just enough cohesion to overcome divides inherent in our sepa-
ration of powers system. 
Polarization defeats this vision. When two polarized parties operate 
not in a parliamentary system fostering majority rule but rather in a sep-
aration of powers system layered with practices that impede majority 
rule, the costs to governance are clear.22 This is particularly true in times 
of divided government, but given the filibuster and other minority-
empowering devices, Congress may struggle to act even during periods 
 
David Karol, American Political Parties: Exceptional No More, in Political Polarization, su-
pra note 5, at 208, 208. 19 E.g., Mann & Ornstein, supra note 14, at 102; Levinson & Pildes, supra note 15, at 
2333. Although the comparison to parliamentary parties is helpful, it does not fully capture 
today’s problems, which also stem from “rogue” actors within each party. See Richard H. 
Pildes, Focus on Political Fragmentation, Not Polarization: Re-Empower Party Leadership, 
in Political Polarization, supra note 5, at 146, 151 (“[E]xcessive political fragmenta-
tion . . . makes American parties today incapable of functioning as truly parliamentary ones, 
even as they become more polarized. The primary reason is that the party elite—leaders in 
the House, the Senate, and the presidency—have lost the capacity they had in some earlier 
eras for disciplining members of their own party.”). Consistent with Professor Pildes’s diag-
nosis, Professor David Schleicher notes that polarized parties are not uniquely problematic 
for American government: “[N]o constitutional or electoral system functions particularly 
well when we see the rise of social groups who care little about achieving incremental legis-
lative success or abiding by the norms of political process.” David Schleicher, Things Aren’t 
Going that Well Over There Either: Party Polarization and Election Law in Comparative 
Perspective, 2015 U. Chi. Legal F. 433, 460. 
20 See, e.g., Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2065, 
2084 (2013) (describing the filibuster in particular as “democratically dysfunctional”).  21 Indeed, the way in which these structures thwart simple majority rule has often been 
seen as their genius. See generally Levinson & Pildes, supra note 15, at 2316–17 (describing 
this popular view of the separation of powers). 22 See generally Austin Ranney, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Com-
mentary, 45 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 488, 495 (1951) (“Unified, disciplined and responsible par-
ties are appropriate only to a government which seeks to locate full public power in the hands 
of popular majorities.”).  
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of unified government. In recent years, we have seen legislative paraly-
sis on the many issues on which today’s Democratic and Republican 
parties have defined and opposing positions—from the environment to 
immigration to fiscal policy. Congress does not adopt new laws or up-
date old ones, while drift means that existing laws may fail to keep up 
with changing conditions.23 Even in areas where a recent Congress man-
aged to pass substantial legislation, subsequent Congresses have failed 
to offer statutory fixes as problems become apparent or otherwise to 
oversee the process of implementation.24 Partisanship also inhibits con-
gressional action with respect to relatively uncontroversial issues. In our 
polarized times, partisan conflict has become a sort of “tribalism” or 
“teamsmanship,”25 and strategic disagreement and the permanent cam-
paign make each party unwilling to hand the other a victory even where 
compromise is possible or a position commands broad support.26 
The same partisan dynamics polarizing Congress and undermining 
the bicameralism and presentment process increase pressure on the ex-
ecutive branch to act on its own.27 Although unilateral executive action 
predates the most recent era of polarization,28 it is especially pronounced 
in times of congressional gridlock.29 On the big issues of the day, the ex-
ecutive branch has sought to formulate and implement policy in the ab-
sence of legislative cooperation. Sometimes, it truly acts without Con-
gress; more often, it relies on existing statutory delegations—the broad 
grants of authority by Congress to the executive branch that have long 
 
23 See, e.g., Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington 
Made the Rich Richer—And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class 52 (2010); Binder, supra 
note 18, at 91–93.  24 See, e.g., Michael S. Greve & Ashley C. Parrish, Administrative Law Without Congress, 
22 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 501, 502 (2015); Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the 
States, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1739, 1748–52 (2015). 25 Mann & Ornstein, supra note 14, at 51; Barber & McCarty, supra note 14, at 20. 26 See John B. Gilmour, Strategic Disagreement: Stalemate in American Politics 9 (1995); 
Binder & Lee, supra note 5, at 244; see also Pildes, supra note 5, at 808 (calling the failure to 
meet basic challenges the “Decline of American Government”). 27 See, e.g., Barber & McCarty, supra note 14, at 50; Persily, supra note 17, at 8; David E. 
Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 Yale L.J. 2, 6–8 (2014).  28 See generally Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral 
Action, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 132 (1999) (describing the President’s power to act unilaterally 
and thereby make law without Congress). 29 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 24, at 1758 (noting that, in times of gridlock, executive 
branch actors feel compelled to develop policy even when they believe new legislation 
would be preferable to administrative decision making). 
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yielded descriptions of a federal government dominated by executive 
power.30 
Because Congress generally delegates authority to federal agencies, 
rather than to the President as such, an important aspect of unilateral ex-
ecutive action is the relationship between the President and the federal 
agencies. Polarized parties more closely link the President and agencies 
and offer the White House additional leverage over administration.31 The 
point can be overstated—federal agencies enjoy a degree of autonomy 
and continue to operate under the oversight of Congress—but polariza-
tion diminishes congressional supervision while enhancing presidential 
authority.32 Although Congress continues to wield power through appro-
priations, for example, spending legislation is hamstrung by polariza-
tion, and “congressional influence through appropriations is often felt 
more through budgetary inaction than actual appropriations legisla-
tion.”33 Legislators may also make their influence felt outside the bicam-
eralism and presentment process, but committee oversight frequently 
devolves into partisan spectacle, while individual members of Congress 
may intervene only to appeal to state or federal executives.34 
 
30 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madi-
sonian Republic (2010); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential 
Lawmaking, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 123 (1994); Thomas W. Merrill, Presidential Administration 
and the Traditions of Administrative Law, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1953, 1958, 1968–69 (2015). 
31 See, e.g., Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why To-
day’s Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop Presidential Initiatives, 45 Willamette L. 
Rev. 395, 411–13 (2009); Metzger, supra note 24, at 1752–54. See generally Daniel A. Far-
ber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 
1137, 1155–60 (2014) (exploring how the White House’s prominent role in administrative 
decision making departs from traditional expectations); Elena Kagan, Presidential Admin-
istration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2272–319 (2001) (describing ways in which the President 
controls administration). 
32 See, e.g., Freeman & Spence, supra note 9, at 64; Metzger, supra note 24, at 1751–53. 
See also Abbe Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unor-
thodox Rulemaking, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1789, 1844–45 (2015) (describing how unorthodox 
lawmaking and rulemaking entail presidential displacement of congressional power). 
33 Metzger, supra note 24, at 1750.  34 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Flexing Agency Muscle?, 48 Ga. L. Rev. 327, 330–32 
(2014); Noah Bierman, California’s Darrell Issa Loses Power Along with House Oversight 
Committee Post, L.A. Times (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/la-na-
darrell-issa-20150321-story.html#page=1 [https://perma.cc/6BKF-3TYY]; Juana Summers, 
Constituent Services Give Voters Something to Remember, NPR (Oct. 28, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/10/28/359615965/constituent-services-give-voters-something-to-
remember [https://perma.cc/SZ4K-NNMC]. 
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Meanwhile, recent decades have seen an increase in both centraliza-
tion and politicization. The President influences federal administration 
by bringing particular decisions within the White House’s purview and 
by appointing ideologically aligned administrators to make policy deci-
sions in the first instance.35 The President’s agenda is especially likely to 
carry the day for salient political issues.36 References to the “executive 
branch” in this Article are thus meant to indicate both the President and 
the federal agencies and to posit the latter as largely in sync with, if not 
directly controlled by, the former.37 
B. State Governments 
At the state level, the story is somewhat different. Here too, there has 
been a gradual expansion of executive power since the mid-twentieth 
century. Governors have become likely to serve multiple terms, and they 
frequently enjoy privileges the President does not vis-à-vis the legisla-
ture, such as the line-item veto.38 They are especially empowered in the 
majority of states with legislative term limits and part-time citizen legis-
latures.39 Although most states impose prohibitions on delegation,40 
broad grants of policy-making authority to state agencies have grown 
 
35 See, e.g., David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in 
an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1095, 1096 (2008). 36 See, e.g., Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 119 Yale L.J. 2, 23–29 (2009). 
37 See generally Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Adminis-
trative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696, 704–05 (2007) (arguing that the President has over-
sight rather than decisional authority).  38 See The Council of State Gov’ts., The Book of the States 2014, 154–55 tbl.4.4 (2013), h
ttp://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/BOSTable4.4.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PHL-
6PR6].  39 See, e.g., John M. Carey et al., The Effects of Term Limits on State Legislatures: A New 
Survey of the 50 States, 31 Legis. Stud. Q. 105, 123–125 (2006) (finding that term limits in-
crease the power of the executive branch over legislative outcomes); Thomas Gais & James 
Fossett, Federalism and the Executive Branch, in The Executive Branch 486, 503 (Joel D. 
Aberbach & Mark A. Peterson eds., 2005) (noting the increase in gubernatorial power since 
the 1960s); Graeme T. Boushey & Robert J. McGrath, Experts, Amateurs, and Bureaucratic 
Influence in the American States, J. Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory (forthcoming) (manuscript 
at 4), http://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/741/docs/Panel4a_paper5_BousheyMcGrath2015_f
orweb.pdf [https://perma.cc/ECV5-XAKN] (finding that “the eroding professionalism of 
state legislatures—coupled with the growing expertise of state executive offices” has in-
creased state executive power at the expense of state legislative power).  
40 See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and Constitutional Duels: Separation of Powers 
and State Implementation of Federally Inspired Regulatory Programs and Standards, 46 Wm. 
& Mary L. Rev. 1343, 1359–62 (2005). 
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common as state legislative expertise has eroded.41 In part, these delega-
tions empower a plural executive42 or the executive-as-unelected-
bureaucracy, but many states have placed administrative agencies under 
gubernatorial supervision and increased the number of gubernatorial ap-
pointees.43 Horizontal relations among states have also enhanced execu-
tive power. Interstate agreements entered into by governors and their 
appointees have enabled state executives to govern without legisla-
tures.44 And organizations like the National Governors Association and 
its partisan variants have pooled resources and political capital and be-
come powerful forces for lobbying in Washington as well as governing 
in the states.45 
Although the relative enhancement of executive power at the expense 
of legislative power is thus apparent at the state as well as the federal 
level, the way polarization affects state governments is somewhat differ-
ent. As in Washington, state governments are becoming more partisan 
and more polarized.46 Yet while we rarely see unified party control of 
both Houses of Congress and the presidency together with the necessary 
supermajority in the Senate to thwart filibusters, unified party govern-
ment has become prevalent in the states.47 If polarization at the federal 
level tends to impede lawmaking, polarization at the state level often fa-
cilitates it. 
Amid polarization, the enhancement of executive power as such may 
therefore be less significant than partisan reliance on both legislative and 
 
41 Boushey & McGrath, supra note 39. 42 See Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1385, 1399–1401 (2008). 43 See Thad Beyle, The Governors, in Politics in the American States: A Comparative 
Analysis 220 (Virginia Gray & Russell L. Hanson eds., 8th ed. 2004).  44 See Joseph F. Zimmerman, Interstate Cooperation: Compacts and Administrative 
Agreements 43–45, 172–76 (2d ed. 2012).  45 See, e.g., John D. Nugent, Safeguarding Federalism: How States Protect Their Interests 
in National Policymaking 115–65 (2009); Gais & Fossett, supra note 39, at 503–04; Judith 
Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal 
Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 709 (2008); Miriam Seifter, 
States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 Va. L. Rev. 953 (2014). 46 Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures, 105 
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 530, 546 (2011). 
47 See State and Legislative Partisan Composition, Nat’l Conf. State Legislatures (Feb. 4, 
2016), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Elections/Legis_Control_2016_Feb.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JDT6-TT7D]. Most state legislatures lack supermajority-forcing devices 
like the filibuster, although a substantial number of states have legislative supermajorities in 
any event.  
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executive powers. Because cohesion within the parties has grown hand-
in-hand with distance between the parties, single-party governance has 
become easier as bipartisan governance has become elusive. For in-
stance, even though the Democratic and Republican parties in Califor-
nia’s legislature are more polarized than the parties in Congress, Demo-
crats control both houses of the legislature and the governorship, so 
polarization yields Democratic policy rather than gridlock. Similarly, 
even though the Democratic and Republican parties in Texas’s legisla-
ture are more polarized than the parties in Congress, Republicans control 
both houses of the legislature and the governorship, so polarization 
yields Republican policy rather than gridlock.48 
As this suggests, the impact of polarization is often more apparent 
across states—Red Wisconsin and neighboring Blue Minnesota furnish a 
much-discussed comparison—than within them.49 While some states 
mirror the federal dynamic of Republican-Democratic contests within 
legislatures or between legislatures and executives, we increasingly see a 
checkerboard of red-state governments and blue-state governments, with 
executives as dominant actors further empowered by ideologically 
aligned legislatures. 
C. Federalism 
Polarized parties affect not only the exercise of power within each 
level of government, but also the relationships among the state and fed-
eral governments. In the United States, political parties have long been 
national—the same parties compete at the federal and state level—and 
these parties have almost entirely lost distinctive regional variants. 
While one can still find partisan differences across the states, terms like 
“Southern Democrat” and “Rockefeller Republican” no longer denote 
parties within parties. Over time, and accelerating with the rise of polar-
 
48 See Boris Shor, State Legislatures and Polarization, Measuring American Legislatures 
(May 21, 2013), http://americanlegislatures.com/2013/05/21/state-legislatures-and-polarizati
on/ [https://perma.cc/JX95-ARX5]. 49 See, e.g., Lawrence R. Jacobs, Op-Ed., Right vs. Left in the Midwest, N.Y. Times (Nov. 
23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/24/opinion/sunday/right-vs-left-in-the-midwes
t.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/VB72-8Q5A]. 
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ization, this has more closely married state and federal politicians, and 
state and federal politics.50 
In the United States today, national partisan conflict and cooperation 
occur in an integrated way across the states and the federal government. 
In previous work, I have focused on the contestatory aspects of this 
“partisan federalism”—the ways in which political actors use both the 
state and federal governments to stage partisan competition.51 In one re-
cent display of how partisan alliances trump institutional affiliations and 
national conflict gets played out in state as well as federal sites, Senate 
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell sent a letter urging governors to re-
sist the Clean Power Plan promulgated by President Obama’s Environ-
mental Protection Agency (“EPA”).52 The most powerful member of 
Congress thus tried to enlist the states to fight another part of the federal 
government on partisan grounds. And he addressed his argument to gov-
ernors in particular, recognizing that the key players in shaping national 
policy and the state-federal relationship had become the executives at 
both levels of government. 
Importantly, however, partisan federalism creates alliances as well as 
opposition. The same Clean Power Plan that Senator McConnell oppos-
es also offers an example of state-federal cooperation fueled by shared 
ideological commitments.53 The decline of dual federalism underlies this 
dynamic—the fact that the state and federal governments regulate in the 
same areas facilitates state-federal cooperation. Indeed, the significance 
of such partisan connections may be most apparent in traditional cooper-
ative federalism schemes, when states and the federal government are 
jointly administering a federal program. But these connections also mat-
ter in the absence of such programs because state legislation or regula-
tion may be a means of furthering a national agenda frustrated in Wash-
ington. Unable to get a minimum wage increase through Congress, for 
example, President Obama seized on already-underway state efforts and 
argued to the National Governors Association, among others, that states 
 
50 State and federal actors are often the same people at different points in time; many 
American Presidents and executive branch officials got their start in state government, with 
the path from governor to President particularly well trodden. 51 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 15. 
52 See Letter from Mitch McConnell, Senate Majority Leader, to Nation’s Governors (Mar. 
19, 2015), http://www.mcconnell.senate.gov/public/i—ndex.cfm?p=newsletters&Conten
tRecord_id=d57eba06-0718-4a22-8f59-1e610793a2a3 [https://perma.cc/47GG-525P].  
53 See infra Subsection III.B.3. 
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could be critical fora for national governance.54 In 2014 and 2015, sev-
eral blue states increased the minimum wage, advancing within particu-
lar jurisdictions a goal broadly shared among Democratic officials.55 
As the Clean Power Plan and minimum wage examples suggest, na-
tional, polarized parties do not generate only federal-state conflict or co-
operation. They generate both at the same time. Party identification 
leads different groups of state and federal actors to ally with each other 
and against opposing groups of state and federal actors. Even this state-
ment is much too simple. As Parts III and IV of this Article argue, parti-
san positions become more complicated as state and federal actors inter-
act in a variety of ways. While the most basic and readily apparent 
dynamic of partisan federalism is that Democrats and Republicans rec-
ognize members of their own party as allies—and members of the other 
party as opponents—across the state-federal divide, diversity exists 
among officials of the same party, especially when they are able to ne-
gotiate on their own instead of aggregating their interests. National par-
ties help to fuel deep federal-state integration, even as a variety of dif-
ferent and shifting relationships emerge from such integration. 
II. BEYOND LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE FEDERALISM 
Partisan polarization has diminished the role of Congress and further 
empowered federal and state executives to shape national policy. Most 
writing about American government in a time of polarization, however, 
 
54 Remarks by the President to the National Governors Association, Office of the Press 
Secretary, The White House (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/02/23/remarks-president-national-governors-association-february-23-2015 
[https://perma.cc/6EMB-N22F]. That states are sites of national politics has hardly been lost 
on the policy demanders that shape partisan agendas. For many years now, interest groups 
like the American Legislative Exchange Council have recognized that national agendas may 
be advanced in the states. See Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Who Passes Business’s “Model 
Bills”? Policy Capacity and Corporate Influence in U.S. State Politics, 12 Persp. on Pol. 582, 
583 (2014). More recently, lobbyists have decreased their spending on federal lobbying and 
turned their attention to state politicians. See, e.g., Reid Wilson, Amid Gridlock in D.C., In-
fluence Industry Expands Rapidly in the States, Wash. Post. (May 11, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/05/11/amid-gridlock-in-d-c-
influence-industry-expands-rapidly-in-the-states [https://perma.cc/XY6Q-WC7W].  
55 See Michael A. Memoli, Democratic Governors Join Obama in Push for Higher Mini-
mum Wage, L.A. Times (Feb. 21, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/21/news/la-pn-
obama-governors-minimum-wage20140221 [https://perma.cc/VC5N-TTFX]; State Mini-
mum Wages, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures (Apr. 4, 2016) http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-
and-employment/state-minimum-wage-chart.aspx [https://perma.cc/HQ69-WKR5]. 
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ignores the states entirely.56 Meanwhile, the federalism scholarship has 
grown increasingly attentive to the place of states in national policymak-
ing, but our two leading models of state-federal relations neglect im-
portant political developments. Even as the dominant literature on legis-
lative federalism appreciates the integration of state and federal actors, it 
continues to focus on Congress. And even as the burgeoning literature 
on administrative federalism appreciates the significance of the federal 
executive branch, it continues to focus on state autonomy. 
Both the legal and the political science literature tend to cast Congress 
as the actor that manages American federalism: Congress represents the 
states in Washington; it decides how state and federal policy will inter-
act and whether federal law will preempt state law; it devises coopera-
tive federalism programs and charges states with implementing federal 
statutes.57 As this last point in particular suggests, scholars of legislative 
federalism have moved well beyond a dualist view of separate spheres 
of state and federal action. They recognize that Congress may not only 
displace the states through federal law but also empower the states by 
conferring resources and new forms of authority on them. In its strongest 
form, this recognition yields the suggestion that state power is a matter 
 
56 For instance, a recent book exploring a wide range of “Solutions to Political Polarization 
in America” does not mention federalism other than a single reference to it as a constitution-
al structure that may impede policymaking. Persily, supra note 17, at 7. Professor Pildes’s 
account of the “Decline of American Government” likewise treats “American Government” 
as the federal government alone. Pildes, supra note 5; see also infra Sections IV.B–C (ad-
dressing some of this scholarship). 
 A growing literature on presidential action similarly considers only the federal government 
and thus sees unilateralism where there may be state-generated multiplicity. See, e.g., Dino 
P. Christenson & Douglas L. Kriner, Political Constraints on Unilateral Executive Action, 65 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 897 (2015); Devins, supra note 31; Pozen, supra note 27. 
57 See, e.g., Martha Derthick, Keeping the Compound Republic: Essays on American Fed-
eralism 38–39 (2001) (discussing choices Congress can make when working with state gov-
ernments); Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States 53 (3d ed. 1984) 
(“[T]he acts of Congress have tended to give the states a firm share in virtually all federal 
domestic programs, including several in which the federal government is apparently given 
the constitutional right to claim exclusive jurisdiction.”); Nugent, supra note 45, at 61–63 
(focusing on interactions with Congress in reviewing the means state actors may use to in-
fluence federal policymaking); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism in Constitutional Context, 
22 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 181, 181–85 (1998) (contending that in cooperative federalism 
programs, state and local governments serve as “agencies of Congress”); Herbert Wechsler, 
The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Se-
lection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543, 558–60 (1954) (emphasizing 
the role of Congress in preserving federalism); Young, supra note 8, at 876 (arguing that the 
principal safeguards of state autonomy are the representation of the states in Congress and 
the difficulty of passing federal legislation). 
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of federal statutory design, that American federalism itself comes by the 
“grace of Congress.”58 
While the legislative federalism literature captures important devel-
opments in its appreciation of state-federal integration, it glosses over 
changes within the federal government. In particular, partisan polariza-
tion presents a serious challenge to the assumption that Congress is the 
federal actor that sets national policy and negotiates with the states. Leg-
islative federalism held sway for much of the twentieth century when 
Congress brokered regional interests and worked across weak party 
lines. And it has enjoyed moments of resurgence in fleeting periods of 
unified (and Senate-supermajority) government, such as the first two 
years of the Obama Administration when Congress enacted the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act, both of which simultaneously al-
tered federal law and conferred new roles on the states.59 But by and 
large, today Congress is not negotiating policy deals or state-federal re-
lations. In areas ranging from climate change to immigration, polariza-
tion means the federal legislature is on the sidelines while executives 
make policy decisions. 
This is not to argue that federal statutes are irrelevant to today’s fed-
eralism. There are federal laws on the books in nearly all important do-
mestic policy areas, and many of these laws provide for state implemen-
tation.60 At some level, then, the federal arrangement continues to be 
authored by Congress even in an era of executive power. Especially as 
these federal statutes age and federal and state executives must confront 
novel problems, however, it becomes more difficult to understand the 
substantive policy choices and the parceling of authority among various 
 
58 See Gluck, supra note 1, at 1999; see also, e.g., Bridget A. Fahey, Consent Procedures 
and American Federalism, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1561, 1568–69 (2015) (endorsing Professor 
Gluck’s view that today’s federalism comes from federal statutes). 59 See Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Imple-
mentation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 Yale L.J. 534 (2011). But cf. 
infra Subsection III.B.1 (discussing executive negotiations around the Affordable Care Act); 
Subsection III.B.4 (discussing Congress’s recent reauthorization of the Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Act).  60 See, e.g., Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2012); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–
7642 (2012); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
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actors as congressional decisions.61 The Clean Air Act, for example, au-
thorizes both the EPA and the states, led by California, to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions,62 but Congress provided virtually no instruc-
tion on how to do so and critical policymaking is necessarily occurring 
outside the Capitol.63 When Congress does manage to adopt substantial 
new legislation, moreover, it tends to enact what Professor Michael 
Greve and Ashley Parrish term “hyper-legislation”—lengthy, complex, 
and even incoherent statutes that spur “executive government.”64 
If Congress is no longer at the helm, it may be tempting to character-
ize the contemporary landscape in terms of administrative federalism. In 
a growing body of work, scholars have explored how federal agencies 
allocate power between Washington and the states and thus shape to-
day’s federalism.65 These scholars appreciate the substantial amount of 
national policymaking undertaken by the federal executive branch rather 
than Congress, recognizing a shift within the federal government that the 
legislative federalism literature largely neglects. Yet they come at feder-
alism questions in a more traditional way, overlooking or discounting 
substantial state-federal integration. 
The administrative federalism literature asks whether federal agen-
cies, and administrative law more generally, may be trusted to safeguard 
state autonomy. Even as scholars embrace the administrative state, they 
adhere to more traditional federalism premises, including that the federal 
 
61 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Poli-
tics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 Yale L.J. 1920, 1938–40 (2014); Freeman & 
Spence, supra note 9; Greve & Parrish, supra note 24. 62 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2012) (allowing waiver of preemption for California’s 
vehicle emissions standards); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (recognizing 
EPA’s statutory authority). 63 See e.g., Freeman & Spence, supra note 9, at 20–21. 64 Greve & Parrish, supra note 24, at 502–03. 65 See generally Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: 
Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 Duke L.J. 1933 
(2008) (critiquing the assumption that Congress is superior to agencies in allocating power 
between states and the federal government); Metzger, supra note 8 (arguing that the Supreme 
Court has been using administrative law to address federalism concerns); Miriam Seifter, 
Federalism at Step Zero, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 633 (2014) (contending that the Chevron 
framework adequately protects the states without a special “Federalism Step Zero”); Cathe-
rine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 Duke L.J. 
2125 (2009) (arguing that agencies are uniquely positioned to protect state regulatory inter-
ests); see also Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Ad-
ministrative Federalism Without Congress, 57 Duke L.J. 2111 (2008) (criticizing administra-
tive federalism and insisting on the centrality of Congress to federalism questions). 
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and state governments are independent and that federal actors will gen-
erally seek to displace state law.66 As a result, nearly all of the scholar-
ship focuses on a single question: What are the conditions under which 
federal agencies may preempt state law? While an important issue (to 
which I return below67), administrative preemption is only a slice of 
state-federal executive interactions. The federal executive branch may, 
for instance, affirmatively seize on state policies to advance an agenda, 
incorporating state regulations into federal regulations or deferring to 
state law in its execution of federal law. State and federal executives 
may negotiate about how to implement federal law. State executives 
may work with each other to generate national policy, at least temporari-
ly, without Washington. 
In short, the state-federal relationship is more reciprocal, and more 
political, than the administrative federalism scholarship suggests. In 
what follows, I seek to build on the important insight that the federal ex-
ecutive branch is a critical player in American federalism while resisting 
the label “administrative federalism” as denoting too narrow a view of 
state-federal interaction. More apt is a label largely unused in American 
discourse68 but familiar abroad: executive federalism. 
III. EXECUTIVE FEDERALISM 
Executive federalism—policymaking through intergovernmental ne-
gotiation by executives at different levels of a federal system—is a 
prominent feature of parliamentary federations, such as Canada and 
Australia, as well as the European Union.69 Because it grows out of ex-
ecutive-empowering parliamentary arrangements at each level of gov-
ernment, executive federalism has long been believed absent, even im-
 
66 See, e.g., Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 65; Metzger, supra note 8; Sharkey, supra note 
65. I elaborate this critique in Bulman-Pozen, supra note 61, at 1924–31. 67 See infra Section V.B. 68 Significant exceptions are Gais & Fossett, supra note 39, and the literature on waiver, 
which defines executive federalism narrowly, e.g., Frank J. Thompson & Courtney Burke, 
Executive Federalism and Medicaid Demonstration Waivers: Implications for Policy and 
Democratic Process, 32 J. Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 971, 972 (2007); see also infra Subsection 
III.B.1 (discussing waiver). Although she does not use that term, Professor Erin Ryan calls 
attention to the significance of the executive branch in her important work on state-federal 
negotiations. E.g., Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within 316 (2011). 69 E.g., Watts, supra note 2, at 3; Tanja A. Börzel, Federalism is Dead – Long Live Feder-
alism!, in EPS Forum: Debating Federalism and Constitutionalism in the European Union 
(2005), https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/eps.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZU7R-ZTZ
L]. 
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possible, in the United States.70 The effects of partisan polarization on 
American separation of powers and federalism, however, have brought a 
distinctive variant of executive federalism to the United States. After 
briefly describing intergovernmental negotiations in parliamentary fed-
erations, this Part uses the examples of healthcare, marijuana, climate 
change, and education to illustrate American executive federalism. 
A. Parliaments and Parties 
Executive federalism, “processes of intergovernmental negotiation 
that are dominated by the executives of the different governments within 
the federal system,” is widely understood to follow from parliamentary 
federal arrangements.71 A leading commentator describes it as “a logical 
dynamic resulting from the marriage of federal and parliamentary insti-
tutions, . . . a dynamic peculiar to, but common to, all parliamentary fed-
erations.”72  
In its standard form, executive federalism follows from three charac-
teristics of the parliamentary federal arrangement. First, at each level of 
government, the executive is the “key engine of the state.”73 In contrast 
to a separation of powers system that seeks to tame government power 
by dispersing it across multiple institutions, the parliamentary design 
seeks to tame government power by fusing legislative and executive au-
thority and placing it under the control of an electoral majority. The par-
ty or coalition that wins the most seats in parliament forms the govern-
 
70 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
71 Watts, supra note 2, at 3; see also, e.g., Herman Bakvis et al., Contested Federalism: 
Certainty and Ambiguity in the Canadian Federation xii (2009) (defining executive federal-
ism as “a pattern of interaction in which much of the negotiating required to manage the fed-
eration takes place between the executives, elected and unelected, of the main orders of gov-
ernments”); Donald V. Smiley, The Federal Condition in Canada 83 (1987) (“Canadians live 
under a system of government which is executive dominated and within which a large num-
ber of important public issues are debated and resolved through the ongoing interactions 
among governments which we have come to call ‘executive federalism.’”); David B. Walk-
er, The Rebirth of Federalism: Slouching Toward Washington 24–25 (2d ed. 2000) (“Execu-
tive federalism is not an American term but is frequently found in analyses of Canadian, 
Australian, and German federalism, given the strength of executive leadership at the national 
and constituent levels in these three parliamentary federal systems.”). 
72 Watts, supra note 2, at 1–2; see also Field, supra note 3, at 118 n.33 (suggesting execu-
tive federalism may be “helpful” in Canada yet “impossible” in the United States). To pro-
vide a little more texture, the footnotes in this Part focus on the Canadian variant of execu-
tive federalism. 73 Thomas A. Hockin, Government in Canada 7 (1975). 
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ment, with the prime minister as leader, and the prime minister and the 
cabinet she appoints carry out executive functions. Second, even as the 
parliamentary structure yields cohesion within a level of government, 
the federal arrangement tempers such unity with a territorial division of 
power. This division of power complicates the project of national gov-
ernance because, whether de jure or de facto, states or provinces enjoy a 
substantial degree of autonomy.74 Finally, executive federalism arises 
because the federal and state or provincial governments are interdepend-
ent in practice.75 This interdependence yields “a continuous process 
of . . . consultation and negotiation.”76 
As this very brief description suggests, executive federalism involves 
mutual reliance among federal and state or provincial actors. Even when 
a country’s constitution provides for a dominant federal government, as 
does Canada’s, for instance, interlocking responsibilities mean that the 
federal government depends on the provinces to achieve its objectives.77 
The resulting policy landscape can be variegated. While negotiations 
among executives offer a route to comprehensive, and uniform, national 
policymaking, such negotiations may also facilitate differentiation with-
in national policy. Bargains struck between the federal government and 
 
74 See, e.g., Richard Simeon & Beryl A. Radin, Reflections on Comparing Federalisms: 
Canada and the United States, 40 Publius 357, 360 (2010). Executive federalism has flour-
ished in countries with a small number of provinces or states (for instance, Canada has ten 
provinces and three territories; Australia has six states and three federal territories), an ar-
rangement that tends to fortify decentralization. See, e.g., Albert Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 
The Size of Nations 137–44 (2005); Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Number of 
States and the Economics of American Federalism, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 2–6 (2011). 
75 Watts, supra note 2, at 3–4; see also, e.g., Bakvis et al., supra note 71, at 103 (noting the 
interdependence of Canada’s federal and provincial governments); Smiley, supra note 71, at 
85 (also noting the interdependence of Canada’s federal and provincial governments).  76 Watts, supra note 2, at 3–4. For instance, in Canada, the provincial and federal govern-
ments work together on healthcare because the provinces have jurisdiction over the admin-
istration of hospitals, while the federal government has jurisdiction over the health of the 
population. See Martha Jackman, Constitutional Jurisdiction over Health in Canada, 8 Health 
L.J. 95 (2000); see also Simeon & Radin, supra note 74, at 360 (noting that interdependence 
means it is “difficult to imagine any policy debate in Canada in which federalism is not at 
the center”). 77 See, e.g., Bakvis & Brown, supra note 3, at 490–91, 499–501. The contours of Canada’s 
executive federalism have changed over time—the Liberal Chrétien and Martin govern-
ments, for instance, embraced high-level provincial-federal cooperation more than the Con-
servative Harper government—but interlocking responsibilities have made some form of ex-
ecutive federalism a constant. See generally James Bickerton, Deconstructing the New Fed-
Federalism, 4 Can. Pol. Sci. Rev. 56, 56–61 (2010) (arguing that all “new federalisms” have 
entailed some form of joint federal-provincial policymaking). 
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the Canadian provinces have in some areas yielded what one commenta-
tor calls “checkerboard federalism”: different substantive policy, and 
different configurations of provincial and federal authority, across the 
provinces.78 In the European Union, differentiation of E.U. policy across 
the member states is still more common.79 A related, notable feature of 
executive federalism is significant collaboration among provincial or 
state executives, and not only between the center and periphery. Nation-
al policy may result from horizontal initiatives.80 
If executive federalism is “a logical dynamic resulting from the mar-
riage of federal and parliamentary institutions,”81 it is unsurprising that 
the comparative literature suggests it is not found in the United States 
and instead, like the domestic literature, emphasizes the role of Congress 
in shaping federal-state relations.82 As the discussion in Part I argued, 
however, partisan polarization has diminished the role of Congress and 
enhanced federal executive power; it has made many state governments 
more parliamentary insofar as single-party government unifies legisla-
tive and executive powers and empowers governors; and it has generated 
strong ties among state and federal officials. 
Put differently, partisan polarization has yielded an idiosyncratic 
American variant of executive federalism. The familiar parliamentary 
version follows from cohesion within each level of government and dis-
tance between them notwithstanding interdependence—that is, from uni-
fied governments at both the federal and state/provincial levels and from 
subunit autonomy. The American version instead follows from internal-
ly divided federal government and strong connections among state and 
federal officials. 
 
78 See also Bakvis, supra note 4, at 205, 207, 211 (describing how talks between the feder-
al government and each province during the late 1990s reshaped labor market policy, as five 
provinces negotiated greater autonomy in the area, while four provinces reached agreements 
to co-deliver programs with Ottawa). 79 See infra Section IV.A (discussing differentiated integration in the European Union). 80 For instance, the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada (composed of the ministers 
of each province) undertakes cooperative educational initiatives, including administering a 
countrywide assessment program, in the service of a national education policy, and its work 
is complemented by regional curriculum consortia. See e.g., Sandra Vergari, Safeguarding 
Federalism in Education Policy in Canada and the United States, 40 Publius 534, 538, 542, 
544–45 (2010). 
81 Watts, supra note 2, at 1. 82 See, e.g., id. at 6; Bakvis & Brown, supra note 3, at 502; Field, supra note 3, at 110–12; 
Simeon & Radin, supra note 74, at 360, 362–63. 
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The partisan genealogy of executive federalism in the United States is 
striking when compared to Canada, in particular. Canadian provincial 
and federal parties are largely distinct; different parties compete in pro-
vincial elections and federal elections, and even those that share a name 
often lack a common identity.83 The party structure is thus bound up 
with the workings of executive federalism: Party government prevails at 
each level of government, but the parties do not bridge the federal-
provincial divide.84 In the United States, the partisan story is nearly op-
posite. The separation of powers and supermajority requirements impede 
party government in Washington, but a national party system generates 
ties among state and federal actors. American executive officials thus 
work together to overcome obstacles within a given level of government 
as much as to manage the federal arrangement. 
Because the parliamentary and American variants of executive feder-
alism have distinct pedigrees, it is unsurprising that they retain important 
differences, not least among them legislative-executive fusion in the par-
liamentary version and an absent Congress in the American version.85 
There is nonetheless a notable convergence: In both systems today, ne-
 
83 See Bakvis et al., supra note 71, at 124; Anthony M. Sayers & Andrew C. Banfield, The 
Evolution of Federalism and Executive Power in Canada and Australia, in Federal Dynam-
ics: Continuity, Change, and the Varieties of Federalism 185, 191 (Arthur Benz & Jörg 
Broschek eds., 2013); Lori Thorlakson, Patterns of Party Integration, Influence and Autono-
my in Seven Federations, 15 Party Pol. 157, 166, 173 (2009). But cf. Anna Lennox Essel-
ment, A Little Help from My Friends: The Partisan Factor and Intergovernmental Negotia-
tions in Canada, 43 Publius 701, 701, 722 n.1 (2013) (suggesting many of the provincial and 
federal parties are “cousins”).  
 Federated parties both reflect and perpetuate the absence of a Canadian federal institution 
designed to represent the provinces. The Senate is instead appointed upon the Prime Minis-
ter’s recommendation, and the Canadian Supreme Court recently rejected the Prime Minis-
ter’s proposal to make the Senate popularly elected in the absence of a constitutional 
amendment. Reference re Senate Reform (2013), [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704, 708 (Can.). It is, 
however, customary for Canada’s federal cabinet to include a minister from each province. 
Bakvis et al., supra note 71, at 123.  84 See Watts, supra note 2, at 11; Beryl A. Radin & Joan Price Boase, Federalism, Political 
Structure, and Public Policy in the United States and Canada, 2 J. Comp. Pol’y Analysis 65, 
69–70 (2000). 85 Parliamentary executive federalism is itself a far more diverse phenomenon than the dis-
cussion here can capture. For example, I have not even noted the German case, which fol-
lows from a federal structure in which the central government sets national policy and the 
Länder implement it; executive federalism in Germany offers a way for the Länder to influ-
ence national policymaking prior to implementation. See, e.g., Watts, supra note 2, at 12; 
Daniel Halberstam & Roderick M. Hills, Jr., State Autonomy in Germany and the United 
States, 574 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 173 (2001).  
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gotiations among state and federal executives generate national policy 
and mediate federalism. 
B. The American Variant 
The lens of executive federalism brings into focus several important 
characteristics of contemporary American governance. This Part uses 
the examples of healthcare, marijuana, climate change, and education to 
elaborate these characteristics: the dominance of executive actors, mutu-
al reliance among state and federal executives, national policy that is dif-
ferentiated across the states, and agreements among state officials that 
inform national governance. As in its foreign manifestations, American 
executive federalism is both cooperative and contestatory.86 Lacking a 
congressional ally, the federal executive may be able to achieve seem-
ingly out-of-reach goals by collaborating with the states. At the same 
time, federal reliance on state authority and state initiative—and federal 
acquiescence in the face of certain state resistance—complicates an un-
derstanding of such executive action as unilateral. 
1. Healthcare 
Because it confers significant authority on the states as well as federal 
agencies, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) is the 
leading example in recent accounts of legislative federalism, the pièce 
de résistance for claims that today’s federalism comes from Congress.87 
Yet negotiations among state and federal executives have transformed 
the statutory scheme. Departing from legislative expectations, a series of 
compromises concerning the Medicaid expansion, health insurance ex-
changes, and insurance plan coverage, in particular, are remaking na-
tional policy. 
A principal tool of executive federalism at play in the ACA’s imple-
mentation is waiver: The federal executive has permitted states to opt 
 
86 Compare, e.g., David Cameron & Richard Simeon, Intergovernmental Relations in Can-
ada: The Emergence of Collaborative Federalism, 32 Publius 49, 49 (2002) (describing Ca-
nadian executive federalism as “collaborative federalism” that entails the codetermination of 
national policy by relatively cooperative bargaining), with Bakvis et al., supra note 71, at 
103 (exploring disagreement in Canadian executive federalism), and Watts, supra note 2, at 
14–15 (same). 87 See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 59.  
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out of statutory requirements.88 With the Medicaid expansion rendered 
truly optional by the Supreme Court,89 and a Congress that has not re-
sponded to this holding, the federal executive has entered into a variety 
of compromises with state executives to achieve its overall objective of 
Medicaid expansion. For instance, following consultation between gov-
ernors and high-up executive branch officials, including White House 
senior advisor Valerie Jarrett, the federal executive approved waivers for 
Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania, 
several of which permit Medicaid expansion through private insurance 
policies.90 The states have not always gotten what they wanted; the fed-
eral executive has rejected proposals for partial Medicaid expansion, 
among others. But notwithstanding the hierarchy baked into the statute, 
political considerations and federal reliance on state implementation 
have yielded a range of compromises.91 
 
88 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver After the Health Care Case, in 
The Health Care Case: The Supreme Court’s Decision and Its Implications 227, 230 (Na-
thaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013); David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big 
Waiver, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 265, 281–82 (2013). Waiver has been the main area in which 
American executive federalism has been recognized to date. See Gais & Fossett, supra note 
39, at 508 (“The most common administrative device that presidents and federal executives 
have used to change the operation of grant programs has been the waiver.”); Thompson & 
Burke, supra note 68, at 972 (using the label “executive federalism” to describe “collabora-
tion between the executive branches at both the federal and state levels to modify the imple-
mentation of grant programs”); see also Bryan Shelly, The Bigger They Are: Cross-State 
Variation in Federal Education and Medicaid Waivers, 1991–2008, 43 Publius 452, 452, 
454–55 (2013) (“Federal waivers . . . have become a critical factor in U.S. intergovernmental 
relations . . . .”); Frank J. Thompson, The Rise of Executive Federalism: Implications for the 
Picket Fence and IGM, 43 Am. Rev. Pub. Admin. 3, 4, 7 (2013) (noting that waivers shift 
decision-making authority regarding grant programs to the executive branch). 89 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012). 90 See John Dinan, Implementing Health Reform: Intergovernmental Bargaining and the 
Affordable Care Act, 44 Publius 399, 411, 414–15 (2014); Shanna Rose, Opting In, Opting 
Out: The Politics of State Medicaid Expansion, 13 The Forum 63, 66 (2015); Frank J. 
Thompson & Michael K. Gusmano, The Administrative Presidency and Fractious Federal-
ism: The Case of Obamacare, 44 Publius 426, 433–34 (2014); see also infra Section IV.B 
(discussing how state-federal negotiations about Medicaid expansion have opened new 
routes to bipartisan compromise). 
91 This use of waiver is consistent with recent decades of domestic policy. Since the 1980s, 
waiver has been a central tool in the fields of welfare and healthcare, in particular, with 
many governors seeking out waivers to advance signature policy initiatives. See Thompson, 
supra note 88, at 13, 15. Estimating that waivers affected three-quarters of welfare recipients, 
for instance, President Clinton insisted in 1996 that “he and the states had already reformed 
welfare while the legislative process in Washington had bogged down.” Gais & Fossett, su-
pra note 39, at 508. Prior to the ACA, Medicaid policy was also shaped by demonstration 
and programmatic waivers. See id. at 509; Thompson & Burke, supra note 68; Thompson, 
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Other aspects of ACA implementation have also generated novel pol-
icies and institutional arrangements. The creation of health insurance ex-
changes, for example, has involved an unanticipated merging of state 
and federal authority. Although the federal statute offers a binary choice 
between state and federal exchanges, the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services (“HHS”) responded to state reluctance by proposing vari-
ous “partnership” exchanges run by the state and federal governments 
together.92 After much back and forth with the Governor, HHS also 
agreed to allow Utah to continue operating its exchange for small busi-
nesses, so that a preexisting state program was folded into the federal 
law.93 Still more surprising to many observers, HHS has decided what 
benefits are “essential” to private insurance plans by deferring to state 
choices. Although Congress drafted the ACA assuming a single, nation-
al definition of essential health benefits, the federal executive branch de-
cided instead to allow each state to define essential benefits based on ex-
isting insurance plans in the state.94 HHS “considered one national 
definition” but rejected that course in favor of “state flexibility.”95 
The past few years of ACA implementation thus reveal how state-
federal bargaining can remake national policy without congressional in-
volvement. They also underscore how states may enjoy substantial pow-
er even when they are administering federal law and the federal execu-
tive branch has legal authority to displace state policy. To be able to 
achieve overarching substantive objectives, to gain political capital, or 
 
supra note 88, at 8–10. In the 1990s, state and federal executives negotiated comprehensive 
waivers moving Medicaid enrollees from fee-for-service programs into managed care, while 
in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, demonstration waivers were used in a way “the drafters of 
the original 1115 [waiver] provision in 1962 almost certainly never envisioned,” as a tool for 
responding to national disasters. Thompson & Burke, supra note 68, at 979–80. 
92 Dinan, supra note 90, at 404. 93 Id. at 406–08; see also Thompson & Gusmano, supra note 90, at 439 (“[F]ederal admin-
istrators respected states that had been ahead of the curve in establishing exchanges.” (em-
phasis omitted)). 94 See Nicholas Bagley & Helen Levy, Essential Health Benefits and the Affordable Care 
Act: Law and Process, 39 J. Health Pol., Pol’y, & L. 441, 442 (2014). 
95 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Essential Health Bene-
fits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,644, 70,665 (proposed Nov. 26, 
2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155, 156); see Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,750, 
10,813 (Feb. 27, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 144, 147, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158). 
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for a variety of other practical reasons, the federal executive makes sig-
nificant concessions to state demands.96 
The ACA rollout further illustrates the relative ease with which exec-
utive federalism may license differences across states with respect to 
federal law. State-based diversity is not unique to executive federalism; 
one of federalism’s traditional selling points is the accommodation of 
state difference, and Congress may choose to shelter or promote a varie-
ty of state policies in federal statutes.97 But because it entails many dis-
crete negotiations between state and federal officials that unfold over 
time, executive federalism is particularly agile at differentiating federal 
schemes, and doing so even when Congress has not contemplated differ-
ent state policy choices. 
2. Marijuana 
Although negotiations about the implementation of federal law often 
yield substantial changes to statutory schemes, these negotiations can ul-
timately be traced to a congressional grant of authority. Even waiver 
provisions are delegations from Congress to the federal executive. The 
executive federalism frame shifts attention from legislative federalism’s 
focus on the authorizing moment to the process of implementation, but 
this shift may be more one of emphasis than conceptualization. 
Executive federalism does not, however, emerge only from federal 
law. Sometimes federal and state executives alike rely on state initiative 
and state law, with the federal executive branch following the state’s 
policy-making lead. In these instances, premises of legislative federal-
ism are inverted: Instead of Congress shaping national policy and feder-
al-state relations, federal and state executives craft national policy, look-
ing to state sources of authority. 
 
96 See generally Ryan, supra note 68, at 329–30 (exploring sources of state power in feder-
alism negotiations); Dinan, supra note 90, at 419 (“[W]hen state nonparticipation threatens 
the success of a program central to a president’s policy agenda, state leverage is at its peak 
and federal concessions most likely.”); Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the 
Way Down, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 33–44 (2010) (discussing ways in which states may exer-
cise the “power of the servant”). 
97 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2006) (granting California possible waiver from federal 
preemption of vehicle emissions standards under the Clean Air Act); Gluck, supra note 1, at 
2008, 2020 (describing how state administration may diversify federal law). 
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This, at least, is one way to understand today’s national marijuana 
policy.98 During the last six years, states have begun legalizing marijua-
na, and there has been “grudging but growing acceptance on the part of 
federal executive officials.”99 In response to medicinal marijuana laws, 
the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) first suggested in 2009 that it would 
limit its enforcement of the federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) 
with respect to conduct that was legal under state law. Deputy Attorney 
General David Ogden issued a memorandum to U.S. Attorneys—
addressing these officials as a way of communicating with an audience 
beyond the federal executive branch—providing that the attorneys 
“should not focus federal resources in your States on individuals whose 
actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state 
laws providing for the medical use of marijuana.”100 Although it empha-
sized that states could not authorize violations of federal law, the memo 
was widely read to indicate that the federal government would let states 
set the contours of federal enforcement. 
DOJ soon pulled back from the Ogden memo. As California voters 
considered a proposition that would have legalized marijuana for per-
sonal consumption, Attorney General Eric Holder promised to “vigor-
ously enforce” the CSA in California even if the proposition were to 
 
98 It is also a way to understand less visible developments, such as state deputation of fed-
eral officers to enforce state law. See State and Local Deputation of Federal Law Enforce-
ment Officers During Stafford Act Deployments (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.justice.g
ov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2012/03/31/state-local-fleo-stafford-act-deployments.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7EKZ-RJKG] (concluding that federal law enforcement officers “may ac-
cept the deputation conferred by state law and make arrests for violations of state law” even 
absent express federal statutory authorization); see also Federal Bureau of Investigation—
Statutory Jurisdiction—Authority of Agents Concerning Non-Federal Offenses, 2 Op. 
O.L.C. 47, 49 (1978) (opining that even though FBI agents lack federal authority to respond 
to state law violations, they may enjoy such authority pursuant to state law). 99 Sam Kamin, The Battle of the Bulge: The Surprising Last Stand Against State Marijua-
na Legalization, 45 Publius 427, 429 (2015); see also Cristina Rodríguez, Federalism and 
National Consensus 26–27 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“[T]he federal 
government’s position has been quite fluid in response to changing circumstances on the 
ground, even if opaque at times (perhaps deliberately so, as the federal government’s own 
position evolved).”)  100 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Memorandum for Select-
ed United States Attorneys: Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medi-
cal Use of Marijuana (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/o
pa/legacy/2009/10/19/medical-marijuana.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UG2-JZ2M]. 
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pass.101 Deputy Attorney General James Cole issued a new memoran-
dum to U.S. Attorneys, noting that there had been an increase in the cul-
tivation and distribution of marijuana for “purported medical purposes” 
and insisting that “[t]he Ogden Memorandum was never intended to 
shield such activities from federal enforcement action and prosecution, 
even where those activities purport to comply with state law.”102 U.S. 
Attorneys in several states responded by indicting medical marijuana 
dispensary operators.103 
When Colorado and Washington adopted ballot initiatives legalizing 
marijuana in 2012, their Governors accordingly worried that they might 
invest resources in the administrative apparatus necessary to tax and 
regulate marijuana, only to have federal enforcement effectively nullify 
the initiatives.104 Attorney General Holder responded that the DOJ 
would not seek to challenge the states’ initiatives as preempted and 
would enforce the CSA in keeping with the priorities laid out in a third 
DOJ memorandum issued the same day.105 Those priorities included 
preventing violence and criminal activity, ensuring marijuana was not 
distributed to minors, and keeping marijuana from being diverted to oth-
er states.106 
 
101 John Hoeffel, Holder Vows Fight Over Prop. 19, L.A. Times (Oct. 16, 2010), at AA1, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/16/local/la-me-marijuana-holder-20101016 [https://perm
a.cc/RAM9-69YD]. 102 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney Gen., Memorandum for U.S. At-
torneys: Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Mari-
juana for Medical Use (June 29, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ oip/le
gacy/2014/07/23/dag-guidance-2011-for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TV
G-FD5Q]. 
103 See, e.g., Feds Warn, Indict California Medical Marijuana Dispensary Operators, 
KABC-TV (Oct. 7, 2011), http://abclocal.go.com/kabc/story?section=news/state&id=838
3655 [https://perma.cc/G6MN-LUAF].  104 See, e.g., Sari Horwitz, Washington Set to Legalize Marijuana Use Without Justice De-
partment Guidance, Wash. Post (Dec. 1, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wor
ld/national-security/washington-set-to-legalize-marijuana-use-without-justice-department-g
uidance/2012/12/01/0a436d64-3b3a-11e2-b01f-5f55b193f58f_story.html [https://perma.cc/9
P4W-Q55U].  105 Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to John W. Hick-
enlooper, Governor of Colo., and Jay Inslee, Governor of Wash. (Aug. 29, 2013), http://dfi.w
a.gov/documents/banks/holder-letter-08-29-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4LM-M9BM]. Ne-
braska and Oklahoma have sued Colorado, arguing that its law is preempted by the CSA. 
See infra Section V.B. 106 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney Gen., Memorandum for All United 
States Attorneys: Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter 
Cole Memo], http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [htt
ps://perma.cc/88G7-QP38]. 
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In effect, DOJ officials proposed a compromise: If states took steps to 
minimize the externalities of greatest concern to the federal executive, 
the DOJ would let states determine how federal law would be enforced 
in their borders. But if state legalization interfered with “federal priori-
ties,” the deal would be off—the federal government might at that point 
not only bring individual prosecutions, but also “seek to challenge the 
regulatory structure itself.”107 So far, the deal seems to be holding as 
Alaska, Oregon, and Washington, D.C. have also legalized marijuana, 
and the DOJ and Treasury have removed additional obstacles to state le-
galization by promulgating a joint guidance for financial institutions 
dealing with marijuana businesses.108 
Without an amendment to federal law, then, executive federalism has 
transformed national drug policy. States have taken the initiative by 
adopting new state laws and establishing novel regulatory apparatuses, 
but negotiations between state and federal officials over the enforcement 
of state and federal law have ultimately determined the contours of to-
day’s drug law. Such executive federalism has allowed for differences 
among the states even in the context of the federal CSA: As a matter of 
federal as well as state law, marijuana today is effectively legal for rec-
reational purposes in four states, legal for medicinal purposes in nine-
teen additional states, and illegal in the remaining states.109 
3. Climate Change 
The discussions of healthcare and marijuana have focused on execu-
tive federalism’s prominent vertical dimension, negotiations between 
state and federal executives that shape national policy. But horizontal re-
lationships among the states are also critical. While legislative and ad-
ministrative federalism scholars have studied ways in which state actors 
collaborate to lobby in Washington,110 the practice of executive federal-
ism pushes us to consider collective state governance. Interstate com-
 
107 Id. at 3.  108 See Kamin, supra note 99, at 427, 432, 436; Dep’t of the Treasury, Fin. Crimes Enf’t 
Network, Guidance, BSA Expectations Regarding Marijuana-Related Businesses (Feb. 14, 
2014), http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2014-G001.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/6D7S-DXGN] (“This FinCEN guidance should enhance the availability of financial 
services for, and the financial transparency of, marijuana-related businesses.”).  
109 See United States, NORML, http://norml.org/states [https://perma.cc/AWM5-YDX3]. 110 See Nugent, supra note 45, at 115–67; Seifter, supra note 45. 
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pacts and more informal agreements among state officials inform federal 
executive action and are reshaped by such action in turn. 
One area in which multistate collaboration has been prominent is cli-
mate change. With Congress long inactive and the EPA beginning to 
regulate only recently, states have taken the lead in addressing green-
house gas emissions.111 Among other programs, more than thirty states 
have climate action plans and renewable portfolio standards, California 
has an economy-wide cap and trade program, and a coalition of nine 
northeastern and mid-Atlantic states have a cap and trade program for 
the electricity sector, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(“RGGI”).112 RGGI is an example of horizontal executive federalism: 
New York Governor George Pataki approached other governors in 2003, 
and a memorandum of understanding was used to create the initiative.113 
Over time, the character of the initiative has become more partisan114 
 
111 See generally Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 1097, 1099 (2009) (exploring how states have addressed climate change but emphasiz-
ing that state responses are the result of “repeated, sustained, and dynamic lawmaking ef-
forts” involving the federal government as well). 
112 See Kirsten H. Engel, EPA’s Clean Power Plan: An Emerging New Cooperative Feder-
alism?, 45 Publius 452, 455 (2015); Center for Climate & Energy Solutions, Climate Action 
Plans, http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/policy-maps/climate-action-plans [https://perm
a.cc/N2YA-ZT9W]; Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org [https://p
erma.cc/7RMM-MLG2]. 113 Gerald B. Silverman, RGGI Holds Bipartisan Support in Northeast As Climate Change 
Issues Debated Nationally, Bloomberg BNA (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.bna.com/rggi-
holds-bipartisan-n17179877193/ [https://perma.cc/3GFW-47AM]. See generally Memoran-
dum of Understanding, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (Dec. 20, 2005), http://rgg
i.org/docs/mou_final_12_20_05.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KY2-DXRC] (creating the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative). 
114 Republican Governor Chris Christie officially withdrew New Jersey from RGGI in 
2012. See Notice of Withdrawal of Agreement to the RGGI Memorandum of Understanding 
from State of New Jersey to Signatory States, Department of Environmental Protection, Re-
gional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (Nov. 29, 2011) (“New Jersey is withdrawing its agreement 
to the [Memorandum of Understanding] and will become a Non-Signatory State as of Janu-
ary 1, 2012.”). Republican legislators in New Hampshire have also introduced bills to with-
draw from RGGI. See, e.g., Rep. Howard Moffett, My Turn: Let’s Not Let the Environment 
Be a Partisan Issue, Concord Monitor (Feb. 17, 2015), http://infoweb.newsbank.com/r
esources/doc/nb/news/1538CFB81EBAE5C8?p=WORLDNEWS. The way in which region-
al environmental efforts have assumed a partisan cast is also apparent elsewhere in the na-
tion: The Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord and the Western Climate Initiative 
were largely abandoned following Republican electoral successes. See, e.g., Geoffrey Craig, 
Six US States Leave the Western Climate Initiative, Platts (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.p
latts.com/latest-news/electric-power/washington/six-us-states-leave-the-western-climate-
initiative-6695863 [https://perma.cc/HVB3-MBMP]. 
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(and arguably somewhat less regional as it links to California’s pro-
gram115). 
The development of RGGI is consistent with trends over time in in-
terstate cooperation. Although compacts and agreements have been a 
part of American federalism since the founding, nearly all such agree-
ments prior to the twentieth century dealt with state boundary lines.116 In 
the 1920s, in keeping with the general enthusiasm of the day for admin-
istrative governance, compacts began to tackle regional rather than 
simply bilateral issues, to address problems that would change over time 
rather than to offer one-shot resolutions, and to establish new institu-
tions, such as commissions or agencies, to furnish day-to-day govern-
ance.117 While the regional consciousness underlying early twentieth-
century compacts was often opposed to nationalism,118 many recent in-
terstate agreements are best understood as national undertakings.119 To-
day, a range of formal and informal interstate agreements seek to ad-
dress problems that transcend state borders, and these concordats exist 
not so much to hold off Washington (in keeping with the standard ex-
planation120) as to substitute for federal governance because Washington 
is not acting.121 Although some commentators have found RGGI per-
 
115 See Dallas Burtraw et al., Linking by Degrees: Incremental Alignment of Cap-and-
Trade Markets 3–4, Resources for the Future (2013) (Discussion Paper) http://www.rff.or
g/Documents/RFF-DP-13-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MHP-KZH9].  116 See Joseph F. Zimmerman, Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Relations 45 (2011). On 
Compact Clause doctrine, see infra Section V.C. 117 See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution – A 
Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 Yale L.J. 685 (1925); cf. Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate 
Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of Permanency, 49 Fla. L. Rev. 1 (1997) 
(considering how compacts that create ongoing administrative agencies raise democratic 
concerns).  118 See, e.g., Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 117, at 708. 119 See, e.g., Caroline N. Broun et al., The Evolving Use and the Changing Role of Inter-
state Compacts: A Practitioner’s Guide 178 (2006); Elazar, supra note 57, at 196. 120 See, e.g., Nugent, supra note 45, at 77–114 (considering how uniform state laws may be 
adopted to “preempt” federal action). 
121 See, e.g., Ann O’M. Bowman & Neal D. Woods, Strength in Numbers: Why States 
Join Interstate Compacts, 7 St. Pol. & Pol’y Q. 347, 359 (2007); see also Ann O’M. Bowman 
& Neal D. Woods, Expanding the Scope of Conflict: Interest Groups and Interstate Com-
pacts, 91 Soc. Sci. Q. 669, 670 (2010) (finding that states are most likely to join compacts 
when they have dense interest group systems).  
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plexing insofar as its benefits do not accrue only to signatory states,122 
the initiative fits comfortably within this trend.123 
In its most recent exercise of authority under the Clean Air Act, the 
EPA has built deliberately on state initiatives including RGGI. Respond-
ing to a presidential instruction, the agency has adopted a set of signifi-
cant rules relating to power plant emissions.124 Although some commen-
tators have suggested that this Clean Power Plan illustrates the centrality 
of “two institutions,” a federal agency and the federal courts, in driving 
environmental policy today,125 the plan also underscores the need to look 
beyond the federal government. There are fifty other actors playing a 
pivotal role because the federal executive is relying on state policies to 
establish national policy.126 In setting emission reduction goals for each 
 
122 See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A 
Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 54, 55 (2005) (“[I]t defies economic logic that 
small subglobal jurisdictions, such as state and local governments in the United States, 
should be doing much of anything to mitigate their comparatively minor contribution to a 
global environmental phenomenon.”); Note, State Collective Action, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 
1855, 1863 (2006) (“Precisely why the states want to participate in RGGI is unclear—
because greenhouse gases do not have localized effects, the states do not seem to receive any 
tangible benefit from this program even though they bear the costs of the cap . . . .”). 
123 As Professor Aziz Huq has noted, undertakings like RGGI that generate public goods 
can be explained by the political benefits obtained by leaders of states with “significant vot-
ing blocs of environmentally conscientious constituents.” Aziz Z. Huq, Does the Logic of 
Collective Action Explain Federalism Doctrine?, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 217, 265 (2014). Put 
slightly differently, these state choices can be explained by partisan politics, which places 
state governance in a national frame and makes state voters and thus state politicians more 
likely to take a community beyond the state as their object of concern. Although interstate 
agreements designed to benefit a group beyond signatory states remain rare, they have be-
come more prevalent in recent years. For instance, the proposed National Popular Vote In-
terstate Compact would commit states that control a majority of electoral votes to casting 
their votes for the presidential candidate who prevails in the national popular vote. By agree-
ing to cast all of their electoral votes for that candidate even if she loses in the participating 
states, those states would be marshaling state power on behalf of a national majority. See 
National Popular Vote, http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/explanation.php 
[https://perma.cc/Y9S2-KP68]. 
124 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) 
[hereinafter Clean Power Plan]. 125 Freeman & Spence, supra note 9, at 28. 126 In so doing, the EPA is following a presidential instruction to “launch [a new regulato-
ry program] through direct engagement with States, as they will play a central role in estab-
lishing and implementing standards for existing power plants.” Power Sector Carbon Pollu-
tion Standards, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,535, 39,536 (July 1, 2013). The turn to the states also 
reflects a critical decision that can be traced to Congress—the Clean Air Act’s provision for 
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state and guidelines for state plans to achieve these goals, the regulations 
embrace California’s cap and trade plan, RGGI, and other state under-
takings.127 As the EPA puts it, in recognition of the states’ “leadership 
role,” its guidelines “are based on and would reinforce the actions al-
ready being taken by states.”128 
Beyond blessing certain existing state efforts as a matter of federal 
law, the Clean Power Plan also facilitates state governance in two nota-
ble respects. First, the Plan establishes a different emissions reduction 
target for each state and gives states flexibility in determining how to 
meet the targets.129 These targets are, moreover, based in part on past 
state policy choices, as manifested in the state’s 2012 carbon dioxide 
emission figures.130 Second, the EPA explicitly recognizes and encour-
ages multistate efforts to address climate change.131 Even though regions 
are often more sensible units than states for addressing environmental 
issues and interest in multistate governance is longstanding,132 there are 
very few ways in which groups of states may assume legal status; most 
of our existing legal frameworks adopt a state-federal binary. Recogni-
tion by the federal government that multistate governance may consti-
tute a form of national governance is one way in which “our regions 
[become] realities.”133 The Clean Power Plan endorses extant multistate 
responses to climate change while smoothing the path to future collabo-
rations among states. In response to state comments seeking more flexi-
bility in multistate approaches—for instance, state-specific plans with 
 
state implementation plans—although the EPA is engaging with the states in novel ways, as 
I will discuss. 127 See, e.g., Clean Power Plan, supra note 124, at 64,678, 64,735, 64,783, 64,796, 64,888. 128 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,832, 34,850 (proposed June 18, 2014) [hereinafter 
Clean Power NPRM]; see Clean Power Plan, supra note 124, at 64,665 (noting that the Clean 
Power Plan is “designed to build on and reinforce progress by states, cities and towns”). 129 Clean Power Plan, supra note 124, at 64,665, 64,888–89.  130 Id. at 64,736, 64,815; see also Engel, supra note 112, at 462 (discussing the notice of 
proposed rulemaking for the Clean Power Plan, which involved a greater degree of state dif-
ferentiation). 131 See, e.g., Clean Power Plan, supra note 124, at 64,838 (“The EPA sees particular value 
in multi-state plans and multi-state coordination, which allow states to implement a plan in a 
coordinated fashion with other states.”). 132 See, e.g., Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 117, at 707–08. 133 Id. at 729. Interstate compacts are another way. See, e.g., supra notes 116–20 and ac-
companying text; infra Section V.C. 
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regionally shared elements134—the final rule allows for both multistate 
plans and individual state plans that will be implemented in coordination 
with other state plans.135 
The Clean Power Plan thus seizes on existing state policies as a basis 
for writing fifty-state differences into a federal rule and further encour-
ages states to collaborate with one another in formulating national policy 
solutions going forward. Against a backdrop of congressional inaction 
and an aging statute that is an awkward fit with greenhouse gas regula-
tion,136 the EPA’s regulation can be understood to substitute state regula-
tory specificity for federal legislative specificity. 
4. Education 
Education policy for the past decade has been set by a series of execu-
tive agreements—among the states, between groups of states and the 
federal executive branch, and between individual states and the federal 
executive branch. Recent federal legislation challenges such executive 
federalism in both form and substance. The area in which state and fed-
eral executive policymaking has been most aggressive thus now offers a 
test for the practice. It is too soon to say whether the Every Student Suc-
ceeds Act (“ESSA”) reveals executive federalism’s limits or, instead, 
demonstrates its durability, but there is reason to suspect the latter. 
Between 2007, when the No Child Left Behind Act (“NCLB”) was 
due to be reauthorized, and December 2015, when the ESSA was 
passed, state and federal executives assumed control of national educa-
tion policy in Congress’s absence.137 States collaborated with one anoth-
er, and the Department of Education, together with the White House, 
embraced, further incentivized, and remolded interstate agreements. Alt-
hough NCLB imposed a set of requirements for states to receive federal 
funding, it left the content of educational standards and assessment to 
 
134 See, e.g., Letter from Mary D. Nichols, Chairman, Cal. Air Res. Bd., to Janet McCabe, 
Acting Assistant Adm’r, Office of Air & Radiation, U.S. EPA 7 (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www
.eenews.net/assets/2015/01/05/document_cw_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/KPZ4-CTKL] (“Cali-
fornia . . . strongly supports allowing regional plans to be implemented in a modular fashion, 
under which states might agree to common plan elements.”). 135 Clean Power Plan, supra note 124, at 64,838–40. 136 See Freeman & Spence, supra note 9, at 21. 137 See Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95 (2015); No Child Left Behind 
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002). 
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states.138 In April 2009, governors and commissioners of education from 
48 states launched an effort to develop common proficiency standards 
for English language and mathematics, resulting in the Common Core 
State Standards.139 The adoption of these standards largely occurred 
through state executive branches140 and prodded additional interstate col-
laboration around implementation.141 
As state executives were collaborating on the Common Core, the fed-
eral executive branch was grappling with the nonamendment of NCLB 
and concerns about enforcing federal statutory requirements that no state 
would be able to satisfy.142 Relying first on Recovery Act funds and then 
on its broad waiver authority under NCLB itself,143 the federal executive 
incentivized states to adopt the Common Core standards.144 The De-
partment of Education did not simply bless interstate governance, but ef-
fectively required it as an aspect of participation in a federal scheme. 
Although the federal executive was not responsible for the establishment 
of the Common Core, then, it was largely responsible for its rapid diffu-
sion.145 The Department further stimulated state collaboration through 
funding to “consortia of states” that would develop assessment systems 
for the Common Core standards.146 The resulting consortia—the Partner-
 
138 See, e.g., Martin A. Kurzweil, Disciplined Devolution and the New Education Federal-
ism, 103 Calif. L. Rev. 565, 595–99 (2015). 139 Development Process, Common Core State Standards, http://www.corestandards.org/a
bout-the-standards/development-process [https://perma.cc/SQ9E-FSW2].  
140 Ashley Jochim & Lesley Lavery, The Evolving Politics of the Common Core: Policy 
Implementation and Conflict Expansion, 45 Publius 380, 383 (2015) (noting that thirty-nine 
states adopted the Common Core through actions by their Chief State Education Officer or 
Board of Education). 141 See Kurzweil, supra note 138, at 623–24. 142 See id. at 605. 143 20 U.S.C. § 7861(a) (2006).  144 In effect, the Department of Education provided that states would have to adopt these 
standards to compete for $4.35 billion in grant money or to obtain a waiver from NCLB re-
quirements. See Kurzweil, supra note 138, at 603–04.  145 See Jochim & Lavery, supra note 140, at 382. More than 80% of states received waiv-
ers. Kenneth K. Wong, Federal ESEA Waivers as Reform Leverage: Politics and Variation 
in State Implementation, 45 Publius 405, 405 (2015). The ways in which the Department of 
Education authorized state governance in the service of a set of shared goals, while retaining 
a role in monitoring and evaluating diverse state actions, also made its actions an example of 
experimentalism. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimental-
ism in the Administrative State, 100 Geo. L.J. 53, 55–56 (2011). 
146 Overview Information; Race to the Top Fund Assessment Program; Notice Inviting 
Applications for New Awards for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,171, 18,171 (Apr. 
9, 2010). 
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ship for Assessment of Readiness for College and Careers (“PARCC”) 
and the Smarter Balanced Assessment Consortium—received funding 
by entering into “cooperative agreements” that provided for “communi-
cation, coordination and involvement” with Department of Education of-
ficials.147 
The federal executive branch also engaged in ongoing negotiations 
with individual states around the NCLB waivers in particular.148 For in-
stance, Oklahoma lost its NCLB waiver after the Governor repudiated 
her support for the Common Core and state membership in the PARCC 
consortium. State officials then entered into discussions with the De-
partment of Education, and the waiver was ultimately reinstated, leading 
one critic to cite “an interesting mix of federal influence and state persis-
tence in resolving the intergovernmental tension over decisions on state 
standards.”149 
Insofar as interstate action facilitated federal executive action and was 
then altered by it—with Congress sitting on the sidelines all the while—
education policymaking has exemplified executive federalism over the 
past decade. It may now reveal the practice’s limits. In December 2015, 
Congress passed and President Obama signed into law the ESSA, a 
lengthy statute that reauthorizes the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act on new terms, replacing NCLB. The ESSA stands out as sub-
stantial federal legislation enacted during a period of divided govern-
ment, with a thoroughly bipartisan vote in Congress.150 In addition to 
complicating (though by no means undermining) claims of polarization-
induced congressional dysfunction, the ESSA also raises questions about 
the robustness of executive federalism. In form, the very fact of such 
federal legislation is a challenge to strong variants of executive federal-
ism. In substance, the ESSA renders “null and void” the waivers granted 
in recent years by the Department of Education to states and consortia, 
 
147 U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Cooperative Agreement Between the U.S. Department of Educa-
tion and the Partnership for Assessment of Readiness of College and Careers (2011), 
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop-assessment/parcc-cooperative-agreement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CR8V-DBB4]; U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Cooperative Agreement Between the 
U.S. Department of Education and the Smarter Balanced Assessment Consortium and the 
State of Washington (fiscal agent) (2011), http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop-
assessment/sbac-cooperative-agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7NN-HFLF]. 148 See infra Section IV.B.  149 Wong, supra note 145, at 420–21. 150 Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015: Record Vote No. 334, 161 Cong. Rec. S8561 
(Dec. 9, 2015); Roll No. 665, 16 Cong. Rec. H884–94 (Dec. 2, 2015). 
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and it curbs federal executive supervision of state education policy going 
forward.151 
Even as the ESSA curtails federal involvement in education policy, 
however, it also blesses certain arrangements that arose from the De-
partment of Education’s negotiations with the states. For instance, while 
the ESSA has been celebrated for authorizing states to design their own 
academic standards and intervention approaches for low-performing 
schools, this is what states have been doing pursuant to waivers from 
NCLB’s requirements. The White House’s suggestion that the ESSA 
codifies “many of the key reforms the Administration 
has . . . encouraged states and districts to adopt in exchange for waivers” 
is no more exaggerated than claims that the ESSA offers a thorough “re-
buke” to the federal executive branch.152 The Act also does not affect 
horizontal interstate collaboration, such as that which produced the 
Common Core.153 Indeed, although the ESSA expressly provides that it 
does not prohibit states from withdrawing from the Common Core, nei-
ther does it invalidate that initiative.154 
More notably, the ESSA creates some fertile new conditions for ex-
ecutive federalism. For one thing, it expands the federal role in discrete 
areas, providing annual funding for preschool education, for example. 
Because the ESSA entrusts these portions of the Act to HHS, the need 
for interagency coordination may spur not only federal executive, but al-
 
151 ESSA § 4(c). In limiting federal oversight, the Act also reprimands the Department of 
Education (which nonetheless supported the bill) with descriptions of the many forms of au-
thority the Department may not exercise. E.g., id. § 1005 (amending 20 U.S.C. § 6311) 
(“The Secretary shall not have the authority to mandate, direct, control, coerce, or exercise 
any direction or supervision over any of the challenging State academic standards adopted or 
implemented by a State.”).  
152 White House, Fact Sheet: Congress Acts to Fix No Child Left Behind (Dec. 2, 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/03/fact-sheet-congress-acts-fix-no-ch
ild-left-behind [https://perma.cc/SY6N-GDGZ]; see Diane Ravitch, Farewell, NCLB, We 
Won’t Miss You, Diane Ravitch’s Blog (Nov. 20, 2015), http://dianeravitch.net/2015/11
/20/farewell-nclb-we-wont-miss-you/ [https://perma.cc/K3ZZ-GY9G].  153 ESSA § 1005(j) (“A State retains the right to enter into a voluntary partnership with 
another State to develop and implement the challenging State academic standards and as-
sessments required under this section . . . .”). 154 See id. § 8036 (“Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit a State from with-
drawing from the Common Core State Standards or from otherwise revising their stand-
ards.”).  
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so more centralized, White House involvement.155 Even as the ESSA 
expressly restricts the Secretary of Education’s authority,156 moreover, it 
retains federal executive oversight, with few parameters set by Con-
gress. Although states will now devise their own accountability goals for 
schools, for example, they must submit their plans to the Department of 
Education.157 Instead of a congressional judgment about metrics by 
which to hold schools accountable, the ESSA provides for state decision 
making with federal executive superintendence. Further, although the 
ESSA narrows the Department’s waiver authority, it does not eliminate 
it; as under NCLB, the federal executive branch may free states from 
particular statutory or regulatory requirements.158 And in crafting a more 
state-centric law, the ESSA codifies a framework for back-and-forths 
between state and federal executives around state plans and waivers.159 
The ESSA thus diminishes federal involvement in education princi-
pally in the form of congressional decisions. It is not clear that it will 
appreciably reduce state-federal executive collaboration, and contesta-
tion, around education policy. As one early critic summarized the feder-
alism implications of the ESSA, “States would be stuck in a dance with 
whoever happens to be running the Department [of Education] at any 
given moment.”160  
*** 
I have attempted in this Part to explore a few examples of executive 
federalism in some detail rather than to exhaustively canvass domestic 
policy. It bears mention, then, that similar processes of state-federal ne-
 
155 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory 
Space, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1131, 1137 (2012). At the state level, the ESSA requires state edu-
cational agencies to consult with the governor in developing state plans. ESSA § 8032. 156 See, e.g., ESSA § 8023. 157 See id. §§ 1005, 8014. 158 See id. § 8013. 159 For example, if the Secretary of Education seeks to disapprove a state plan, she must 
(among other things) notify the state, offer an opportunity for revision and resubmission, and 
furnish technical assistance to the state. See id. §§ 1005, 8014. 160 Connor Williams, Why Progressives Should Fear, Conservatives Should Hate and 
Obama Should Veto the NCLB Rewrite, The Seventy Four (Nov. 29, 2015), 
https://www.the74million.org/article/williams-why-progressives-should-fear-conservatives-
should-hate-and-obama-should-veto-the-nclb-rewrite [https://perma.cc/J5G6-EKWX]. 
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gotiation and coevolution are apparent in a variety of other areas, includ-
ing criminal justice,161 labor,162 national security,163 and even immigra-
tion.164 
The interactions of state and federal executives have also given rise to 
some distinct yet closely related practices. Most notably, in recent years 
federal agencies and state attorneys general have undertaken joint en-
forcement and litigation efforts. Multistate attorney general litigation has 
received substantial attention, as have the transparently partisan efforts 
of state attorneys general to challenge federal law.165 But state attorneys 
general are increasingly not only setting national policy without Wash-
ington or opposing the national policy Washington has set; they are also 
working together with the federal executive branch to further shared pol-
icy aims. 
For example, joint federal agency-state attorney general action has 
become a leading regulatory strategy in the area of consumer protection. 
In 2012, DOJ, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and 
forty-nine state attorneys general reached a $25 billion settlement with 
the nation’s five largest mortgage servicers that not only provided finan-
cial relief, but also required the servicers to change their operating prac-
tices going forward.166 In announcing the settlement, Colorado’s attor-
 
161 See Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 
Crime & Just. 377 (2006). 162 See Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 
Fed. Reg. 72,006 (proposed Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510) (proposing 
a rule that would create a safe harbor from ERISA preemption for state payroll deduction 
savings programs, following state innovation in the area). 
163 See Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 Stan. 
L. Rev. 289 (2012).  164 See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Re: Se-
cure Communities (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publicati
ons/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf [https://perma.cc/GV39-WB7H] (discontinu-
ing the Secure Communities program in the face of resistance from “Governors, mayors, and 
state and local law enforcement officials”; introducing the Priority Enforcement Program for 
federal-state collaboration; and noting that the Secretary is “willing to personally participate” 
in discussions with state and local governments about immigration enforcement); Rodríguez, 
supra note 99.  165 See, e.g., Paul Nolette, Federalism on Trial: State Attorneys General and National Poli-
cymaking in Contemporary America 198–203 (2015).  
166 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Government and State Attorneys 
General Reach $25 Billion Agreement with Five Largest Mortgage Servicers to Address 
Mortgage Loan Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.justice.gov
/opa/pr/federal-government-and-state-attorneys-general-reach-25-billion-agreement-five-
largest [https://perma.cc/VT8Z-UWMV]. 
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ney general stated that “partnership with the federal agencies made it 
possible to achieve favorable terms and conditions that would have been 
difficult for the states or the federal government to achieve on their 
own.”167 An ongoing example of such national policymaking through 
conjoined state and federal action involves a slew of investigations, en-
forcement actions, and lawsuits against for-profit colleges by the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Education, 
DOJ, and dozens of state attorneys general.168 Because multistate-federal 
litigation raises some different questions than the practices I explore in 
this Article, I do not further address this ascendant form of “regulation 
through litigation,”169 but mention it here simply to suggest the variety 
of forms state-federal executive governance may assume. 
IV. A QUALIFIED DEFENSE 
Given the ways in which executive federalism departs from tradition-
al understandings of both the separation of powers and federalism, criti-
cisms of the practice come easily. For those who continue to oppose the 
rise of the administrative state and cooperative federalism, in particular, 
executive federalism will be the latest abomination.170 But even those 
more sanguine about federal administrative authority and the integration 
of state and federal governments may well be concerned about leaving 
Congress on the sidelines of national policymaking. My aim in this Part 
is to present an affirmative case for executive federalism—not as a first-
best design, but as a relatively attractive option given political reali-
ties—while also suggesting some areas of concern and standards against 
which to judge its practice. 
 
167 Id. 168 See, e.g., Kelly Field, As Scrutiny Intensifies, For-Profit Colleges Face Threats on Sev-
eral Fronts, Chron. Higher Educ. (May 18, 2015), http://chronicle.com/article/As-Scrutiny-
Intensifies/230215 [https://perma.cc/H93J-57SV].  169 Regulation Through Litigation (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002). 170 See generally Michael S. Greve, The Upside-Down Constitution (2012) (cooperative 
federalism); Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? (2014) (administrative 
state); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231 
(1994) (administrative state). Indeed, after drafting this Article, I found a blog post suggest-
ing just such opposition. Michael S. Greve, The Rise of Executive Federalism, Real Clear 
Policy (May 26, 2015), http://www.realclearpolicy.com/blog/2015/05/26/the_rise_of_execu
tive_federalism_1305.html [https://perma.cc/T3PN-CUYN]. 
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Any plausible claim about the current functioning of our constitution-
al institutions must take political polarization into account. It is of lim-
ited utility to compare executive federalism to a well-functioning separa-
tion of powers system, one that involves congressional debate and 
compromise on issues of national importance as well as a productive 
friction among the branches and among the federal and state govern-
ments. Considered in context, executive federalism emerges as a path to 
national policymaking amid polarization. While enhancing the federal 
executive’s capacity to act in the face of congressional dysfunction, it 
also entails the contestation endemic to state-federal relations. Moreo-
ver, even as executive federalism generates additional sites for partisan 
conflict, so too does it offer new routes to bipartisan compromise and 
negotiation that seem out of reach in Congress. 
This Part attempts to account for the centrality of polarized parties in 
considering executive federalism along three dimensions: governance, 
compromise, and representation. First, I suggest that executive federal-
ism facilitates governance in a polarized polity and that it does so in part 
by accommodating diversity within national policy, in a manner loosely 
akin to Europe’s differentiated integration or Canada’s checkerboard 
federalism. Second, I argue that executive federalism offers a promising 
forum for bipartisan compromise and transactional politics given its em-
phasis on implementation and iterative interactions among disaggregated 
institutional actors. The most often-criticized aspect of executive feder-
alism abroad—its relative lack of transparency—may in fact be a selling 
point in this regard. Finally, I consider how executive federalism may be 
something other than a threat to democratic representation despite its 
obvious shortcomings. Our federal system generates opportunities for 
national political representation beyond Washington, and executive fed-
eralism holds out the possibility that concrete policy choices may stimu-
late deliberation and that constituencies may transcend territorial desig-
nations. 
A. Governance: State-Differentiated National Policy 
Perhaps the most straightforward reason to embrace executive feder-
alism is that it enables national governance in an era when polarization 
paralyzes Congress. As Professors Mark Warren and Jane Mansbridge 
have argued, accounts of democracy often focus on the “demos,” not the 
“kratos,” but “the capacity for action is part of democracy, insofar as a 
political system should empower collectivities to respond to their collec-
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tive problems and aspirations.”171 Even absent polarization, our constitu-
tional structure impedes national majority rule, but polarization leads to 
extreme forms of inaction on issues of general concern. Executive feder-
alism offers a potential path forward: national policy that encompasses 
partisan differentiation across the states. Some states may more fully or 
strongly press a position shared by the federal executive while others of-
fer dissenting or competing views, but in both cases different state ap-
proaches are part of national policy. 
As I have suggested, executive federalism grows out of the political 
polarization of our times. Hyperpolarized parties gridlock Congress and 
further empower the executive branch, but they also create strong links 
across the state-federal divide.172 These links may enable something like 
party government through state-federal cooperation among co-partisans, 
enhancing the ability of the federal executive and certain states to act. At 
the same time, the state-federal connection amplifies opportunities for 
partisan resistance and contestation. If state and federal executives seek 
each other out because of partisan affinity, their collaborations tend also 
to bring in other state actors with opposing positions. 
The most basic way executive federalism has negotiated these distinct 
possibilities is by allowing for differentiation within national policy 
across states. For instance, waivers under the ACA have fostered Demo-
cratic states’ implementation of the Act while permitting departures 
from federal statutory provisions in certain Republican states.173 Federal 
executive deference to state understandings of required insurance cover-
age has likewise made the ACA’s essential benefits provision differ 
across the states.174 Similarly, Colorado, Washington, Oregon, and Alas-
ka have effectively nullified the federal CSA with respect to most mari-
juana offenses within their borders, but the CSA remains operative in 
states that continue to criminalize marijuana.175 The EPA’s Clean Power 
Plan is a more deliberately designed state-differentiated policy.176 The 
final rule walks back a surprising form of differentiation found in the 
 
171 Warren & Mansbridge, supra note 5, at 87–88; cf. Gluck, O’Connell & Po, supra note 
32, at 1842 (“[U]northodox policymaking may . . . advance[] the legitimacy of government 
getting its work done.”). 172 See supra Part I.  173 See infra Section IV.B (exploring more complicated bipartisan negotiations around 
ACA implementation). 174 See id.  175 See supra Subsection III.B.2.  176 See supra Subsection III.B.3.  
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proposal—an apparent attempt to pacify opposition in coal-reliant, Re-
publican jurisdictions—that would have required the states emitting the 
most greenhouse gasses to do the least.177 But the rule continues to fur-
nish different emissions reduction targets for each state while allowing 
for state flexibility in meeting these targets.178 
State-differentiated policy of this sort is relatively novel in the United 
States, but it has analogues abroad.179 In a variety of federations with 
stronger traditions of executive federalism, national policy is often de-
veloped in a nonuniform fashion.180 In Canada, for example, negotia-
tions can yield significant policy variation across the provinces and dif-
ferent degrees of provincial and federal responsibility, an outcome 
sometimes called “checkerboard federalism.”181 In the European Union 
(E.U.), states often work toward shared objectives at varied speeds, or 
subgroups of states pursue shared policies without full E.U. participa-
tion.182 This practice of “differentiated integration” allows groups of 
states to create E.U. policy in the absence of consensus.183 Sometimes 
the differentiation is simply a matter of timing: With “multi-speed” inte-
gration, a subgroup of states realizes a common policy faster than other 
 
177 If the proposal was an attempt to appease such jurisdictions, it did not succeed. See 
West Virginia v. EPA (In re Murray Energy Corp.), 788 F.3d 330, 333–34 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(declining a challenge by States including West Virginia to EPA’s proposed rule because it 
was not final agency action). Many States are now challenging the final Clean Power Plan. 
See West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15A773, 136 S. Ct 1000 (Mem.), 2016 WL 502947 (Feb. 9, 
2016) (granting application for a stay of the Clean Power Plan pending judicial review in the 
D.C. Circuit); Alan Neuhauser, Mess of Lawsuits Set to Challenge Clean Power Plan, U.S. 
News (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/10/23/mess-of-lawsuits-
set-to-challenge-clean-power-plan [https://perma.cc/LE8J-56RP].  
178 See Clean Power Plan, supra note 124; Engel, supra note 112. 
179 See Timothy Conlan et al., Unsafe at Any Speed? The Emergence of Variable Speed 
Federalism in the United States and the European Union 2–5, 20–21 (Aug. 25, 2014) (un-
published manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2454136 [https://perma.cc/EZU2-
XXXS] (comparing recent developments in U.S. law to Europe’s multi-speed federalism). 
180 The point applies to other multimember institutions as well. See Anu Bradford, How 
International Institutions Evolve, 15 Chi. J. Int’l L. 47, 52 (2014) (“An inquiry into evolving 
dynamics of some key institutions, such as the WTO, the EU, and NATO, reinforces the 
conclusion that after [a certain threshold of diversity] is met . . . . universal obligations give 
way to differentiated responsibilities.”). “Common but differentiated responsibilities” are 
also a feature of international law. For instance, international environmental agreements ad-
just states’ obligations in light of their capacity to comply. Id. at 72–73. 
181 Bakvis, supra note 4. 182 See Kölliker, supra note 4; Stubb, supra note 4. 183 See Kölliker, supra note 4, at 14–16. 
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states, but all states ultimately participate.184 In other instances, differen-
tiation may be long lasting or permanent: With “variable-geometry inte-
gration,” only certain states participate in a common project, while “a la 
carte integration” permits states to adopt particular aspects of policies.185 
These various forms of differentiated integration have led commentators 
to observe that there is not one Europe, but rather many Europes, de-
pending on “the policy field in question.”186 
In the E.U., Canada, and several other federations, differentiated inte-
gration or related forms of variegated policymaking arise principally be-
cause of subunit autonomy and consensus rules. Demanding full, uni-
form participation would foreclose the pursuit of certain policies or 
water down obligations for all.187 As with executive federalism general-
ly, state-differentiated national policy arises from distinct circumstances 
in the United States. The federal government has legal authority to man-
date national policy and to override conflicting state views in the ab-
sence of unanimity. Indeed, it was designed to facilitate collective gov-
ernance without consensus rules.188 But polarization makes the political 
realities of American governance more closely resemble those in federa-
tions with weaker central governments and stronger subunit autonomy. 
Frequently, the federal government cannot act even when it is constitu-
tionally authorized to do so; states therefore become necessary engines 
of national policymaking, yet states are also polarized, so national policy 
cannot be made by the fifty states working collectively. Instead, the fed-
eral executive branch and the states seek out one another to push for-
ward particular objectives. In response to political polarization, then, the 
 
184 Douglas Webber, The Politics of Differentiated Integration in the European Union: Or-
igins, Decision Making and Outcomes 4 (Monash Univ. European & EU Ctr., Working Pa-
per No. 2012/1, 2012), http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/europecentre/files/2012/08/MEEU
C_WP2012_01-Webber.pdf [https://perma.cc/TN7D-PJL6].  
185 Id. For instance, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden do not participate in the 
Eurozone, while the United Kingdom and Ireland do not participate in the Schengen Agree-
ment removing internal border controls. Meanwhile, non-E.U. members, including Iceland, 
Norway, and Switzerland, have opted into Schengen. See Schengen Visa Countries List, 
Schengen Visa Info, http://www.schengenvisainfo.com/schengen-visa-countries-list [https://
perma.cc/X6VV-NX64]. 
186 See Conlan et al., supra note 179, at 20.  187 See Kölliker, supra note 4, at 2, 16, 28; Bradford, supra note 180, at 72–73. 188 See Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism 138–82 (2011); Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. 
Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 Stan. L. 
Rev. 115 (2010); Richard E. Levy, Federalism and Collective Action, 45 U. Kan L. Rev. 
1241 (1997). 
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United States is groping its way toward checkerboard federalism or dif-
ferentiated integration.189 
As this account suggests, state-differentiated national policy is not 
likely to be embraced as a first-best governance strategy; some would 
prefer uniform policy set by the federal government, while others would 
prefer more devolution to the states.190 It is worth noting, however, that 
these preferences largely depend on the partisan composition of each 
government rather than something about state versus federal authority as 
such.191 The same Democrats who today favor federal policy solutions 
championed state authority during George W. Bush’s presidency, and 
the same Republicans who today disparage federal overreach were eager 
to preempt state experimentation when Bush was President.192 While 
such partisan motivations need not discredit the institutional arguments 
that result, they do suggest that we might more forthrightly consider pol-
itics in our legal analysis. 
Taking politics into account, there is a strong case for state-
differentiated federal policy as compared to the alternatives that emerge 
from a polarized Congress. In contrast to unilateral federal executive ac-
tion, state participation builds multiplicity and a degree of contestation 
into federal policy; it diminishes the specter of unchecked authoritarian-
ism that haunts exercises of executive power.193 State participation also 
incorporates values traditionally associated with federalism, such as di-
versity and experimentation, into national policy.194 
State-differentiated policy may be superior to pure decentralization as 
well. A basic descriptive observation is that independent state action is 
not possible in many areas given federal laws already on the books. But 
autonomous state action is not necessarily desirable either. In contrast to 
outright devolution, state-differentiated policy respects the need for na-
tional responses to certain problems. It acknowledges the possibility of, 
 
189 See Conlan et al., supra note 179.  190 See id. at 27 (arguing that differentiated integration is a second-best solution). But see 
Bradford, supra note 180, at 50, 52–53 (defending differentiated integration as a desirable 
end goal).  191 See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 15, at 1091–92; see also Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sun-
stein, Institutional Flip-Flops, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 485, 486 (2016) (“What is the proper relation-
ship between the national government and the states? . . . [I]n numerous cases . . . responses 
seem to depend on the answer to a single (and apparently irrelevant) question: Who currently 
controls the relevant institutions?”). 
192 E.g., Bulman-Pozen, supra note 15, at 1102–03. 
193 See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 11; Bulman-Pozen, supra note 61, at 1922, 1935–46. 194 See Gluck, supra note 1, at 1999. 
COPYRIGHT © 2016, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION  
2016] Executive Federalism Comes to America 999 
and the responsibility of working toward, national cohesion even in the 
face of disagreement.195 
This last point raises the important question of whether, in the United 
States, state-differentiated national policy may still fairly be described as 
differentiated “integration.” There is an obvious sense in which the label 
does not fit. In contrast to federations like the E.U., the United States is 
not in the process of forming a union, and, apart from perhaps some mi-
nor tinkering, the country is not going to alter the composition of its fif-
ty-state membership. If the partial adoption of national policy is not 
bringing more states into closer union but instead allowing some states 
to disengage, then perhaps in the American context differentiated inte-
gration is a form of disintegration? 
To some extent, this is an empirical question that awaits data: Over 
time, will allowing for state difference facilitate national policymaking 
on contentious issues and enhance consensus, or will it underlie further 
state-based dissent and disengagement from the project of national gov-
ernance? One particular form this question might take concerns feed-
back effects. Might executive federalism make Congress even less capa-
ble of governing by removing pressure for it to address certain issues? 
Although the question merits further study, we should not reject execu-
tive federalism offhand on this assumption. Recent action-forcing devic-
es, like the fiscal cliff and sequester, underscore the problematic charac-
ter of an if-things-get-bad-enough-Congress-will-act logic. Moreover, 
the ESSA suggests the opposite may be true: Executive federalism may 
complicate partisan commitments, forge unexpected coalitions, and ex-
pose new issues in ways that facilitate congressional action.196 While this 
single piece of legislation by no means furnishes sufficient support for 
the proposition that executive federalism makes Congress more capable 
of governing—indeed, the Act is itself an ambivalent act of national pol-
icymaking, a federal law that militates toward less federal control and 
less consistent policy across the country197—it at least belies the strong 
claim that executive federalism forecloses legislation. Moreover, even 
 
195 See generally Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 
123 Yale L.J. 1889 (2014) (describing how federalism may serve national ends); Gerken, 
supra note 96 (same); Rodríguez, supra note 99 (arguing that disagreement among the states 
may further national policy interests). 
196 See supra Subsection III.B.4; infra Section IV.B. 197 Cf. Gluck, supra note 1, at 2020 (noting that Congress may seek “disuniform imple-
mentation of national law”).  
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without inspiring new federal legislation, state differentiation may ulti-
mately facilitate agreement about national policy. The history of Medi-
caid, for instance, bolsters the prediction that state resistance to the ACA 
will dissipate over time.198 In the European context, subgroups moving 
ahead in a particular policy area have commonly pulled other states 
along, as outsiders come to see benefits from being included in ongoing 
cooperative projects or to realize costs from remaining excluded.199 
We cannot confidently predict that state-differentiated policy will 
yield national uniformity and consensus, however. For one thing, in 
many areas, federal intervention occurs because of collective action 
problems; if certain groups of states agree to move ahead on these is-
sues, they may well create benefits on which nonparticipating states 
free-ride, leaving them no incentive to join at a later time.200 Further, 
partisan polarization has already upset much conventional wisdom about 
state-federal relationships, for instance, that states always accept federal 
grants.201 State-differentiated national policy could exacerbate both the 
partisanship that drives intergovernmental disagreement and the resur-
gent sectionalism of American politics. 
While the empirics are uncertain, a commitment to national integra-
tion nonetheless suggests that certain forms of differentiation are more 
attractive than others and that the parameters of differentiation should 
vary between those states that are part of a longstanding union and those 
that are still experimenting with union formation. For the former, we 
should be particularly concerned about full state opt-outs from national 
policy. This is in part for the practical reason that opt-outs may damage 
the prospect of national policymaking; if government is responding to 
collective action problems, state opt-outs may vitiate participation alto-
 
198 See, e.g., Shanna Rose, Financing Medicaid: Federalism and the Growth of America’s 
Health Care Safety Net 14, 17–18, 245–46 (2013). 199 See Kölliker, supra note 4, at xix, 2, 4, 278; Stubb, supra note 4, at 154–56, 167; Jan-
Emmanuel De Neve, The European Onion? How Differentiated Integration Is Reshaping the 
EU, 29 Eur. Integration 503, 512 (2007).  200 See Kölliker, supra note 4, at xix (“Differentiated integration theory suggests that such 
centripetal effects of flexible arrangements on initially reluctant outsiders depend both on 
whether non-participants can be excluded from the benefits cooperation generates, as well as 
on whether the consumption of such benefits is rival, neutral, or even complementary. . . . 
The weakest centripetal effects are expected in the case of common pool resources, which 
combine non-excludability and rivalry in consumption.”); Cooter & Siegel, supra note 188, 
at 144.  
201 See Sean Nicholson-Crotty, Leaving Money on the Table: Learning from Recent Re-
fusals of Federal Grants in the American States, 42 Publius 449, 461–62 (2012). 
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gether. Although partial concessions to oppositional states might also 
mean some states are contributing disproportionately to a collective en-
deavor, the fact of universal participation should mitigate a “sucker ef-
fect” for those states carrying the greatest burden.202 More deeply, even 
in polarized times, we should seek differentiation that generates political 
interaction among those who disagree about policy choices.203 Allowing 
states to opt out of national policymaking altogether short-circuits such 
interaction and the integrative possibilities of even contestatory forms of 
engagement. 
In judging the state-differentiated national policies produced by exec-
utive federalism, then, we should consider whether both states and the 
federal government alike are participating in some form in national poli-
cymaking. In contrast to a system of opt-ins and opt-outs, diversified 
participation may have salutary implications for democratic representa-
tion, as I discuss below.204 It may also create new opportunities for bi-
partisan negotiation and compromise, as I now address. 
B. Compromise: Disaggregated Negotiation 
A growing body of literature searching for “solutions to political po-
larization in America” has resigned itself to working with the parties and 
the institutions we have.205 This literature departs from proposals to fun-
damentally alter government structures or the politicians who occupy 
them. Taking our separation of powers system and polarization as a giv-
en, scholars seeking paths to policymaking by “enemies, not friends,” 
highlight the centrality of negotiation.206 Because this work focuses only 
 
202 See Mel E. Schnake, Equity in Effort: The “Sucker Effect” in Co-Acting Groups, 17 J. 
Mgmt. 41, 43–45 (1991). 
203 See Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Feder-
alism, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 57, 78–99 (2014).  204 See infra Section IV.C.  205 E.g., Persily, supra note 17. 206 Jane Mansbridge, Helping Congress Negotiate, in Political Polarization, supra note 5, at 
262, 263; see also Binder & Lee, supra note 5, at 240–41, 257–59 (“In the United States, 
both political and policy considerations complicate successful negotiation, especially in pe-
riods of polarized parties.”); Pildes, supra note 5, at 828, 831–32 (“[W]e should focus less on 
individual citizens and turn instead to the current or possible organizational entities that have 
the most powerful incentives to aggregate the broadest array of interests into democratic pol-
itics—and to force compromise, negotiation, and accommodation between those interests.”); 
Jonathan Rauch, Political Realism: How Hacks, Machines, Big Money, and Back-Room 
Deals Can Strengthen American Democracy, Brookings Ctr. for Effective Pub. Mgmt. 1–2 
(2015), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2015/04/political-realis
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on the federal government and Congress in particular, however, it over-
looks some of the most effective “institutional environments or structur-
al conditions that enable effective negotiations among political leaders” 
about national policy.207 Scholars have long noted that “[b]argaining is 
the usual mode of intergovernmental relations.”208 With states today op-
erating as national partisan actors, such bargaining has implications not 
only for federalism but also for party politics and the development of na-
tional policy. And some of the factors that scholars of polarization cite 
as critical to political negotiation—such as repeat play and a degree of 
confidentiality—come more naturally to state-federal executive rela-
tions. 
Compared to legislative processes, executive federalism has several 
advantages in fostering negotiation across the political spectrum. First, 
as differentiated integration underscores, negotiations may be bilateral 
or partially multilateral. Instead of a need for a grand compromise that 
satisfies an aggregate national body, executive federalism may unfold 
through many smaller compromises that satisfy disaggregated political 
actors.209 The sum total of these negotiations shapes national policy, but 
no one negotiation does. This disaggregated quality can reduce the parti-
san temperature and bring intraparty difference to the fore. Second, be-
cause it tends to arise in the process of implementing national policy 
over a period of time, state-federal bargaining involves iterated interac-
tions over both bigger-picture issues and smaller details. Such imple-
mentation is policymaking, not mere transmission of preexisting instruc-
tions, but it is more concrete than lawmaking, and partisan dogmas may 
be unsettled as new issues arise in the implementation process. Third, 
federal and state executives tend to be differently situated with respect to 
particular programs: The states may rely on the federal executive for 
funding as the federal executive relies on the states to achieve its policy 
goals; or the states may rely on federal cooperation to achieve their poli-
cy goals as the federal government relies on the states for political capi-
 
m-rauch/political-realism-rauch.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/KES8-588P] (advocating politi-
cal realism, grounded in transactional politics). 207 Pildes, supra note 5, at 845.  208 Derthick, supra note 57, at 39; see also Ryan, supra note 68, at 279 (“The boundary be-
tween state and federal power [i]s a project of ongoing negotiation across the regulatory 
spectrum.”).  209 The move to disaggregated, bilateral institutions has also occurred abroad. See, e.g., 
Smiley, supra note 71, at 98 (noting that negotiations between the Canadian federal govern-
ment and individual provinces have been more likely to yield agreement). 
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tal. Such mutual reliance, but varied responsibilities and interests, may 
create more paths to, and incentives for, compromise. Finally, executive 
negotiations may transpire in greater secrecy than legislative delibera-
tions that occur in the sunshine. 
Consider, for instance, how executive federalism has been remaking 
national healthcare law, with state-federal negotiations about insurance 
exchanges and the Medicaid expansion opening new routes to bipartisan 
compromise.210 Such compromises are mostly arising from discrete in-
teractions among particular state and federal executives, and they seize 
on finer-grained questions to begin to find common ground, or at least 
mutual acquiescence, amid sharp polarization. For instance, in negotia-
tions around the creation of insurance exchanges, HHS repeatedly ex-
tended filing deadlines partly in response to requests from Republican 
governors; it allowed Utah to operate a separate small business exchange 
that the state cast as more “market-based” than HHS’s understanding of 
the Act, which required “a more government-centric” approach resulting 
in “less choice and more reliance on public programs”; and it developed 
alternative forms of partnership exchanges that created ongoing working 
relationships between federal officials and Republican state officials.211 
Today, Arkansas, Kansas, Nebraska, Ohio, and South Dakota, among 
other red states, have agreed to coordinate with the federal executive.212 
Although HHS has decisive legal authority with respect to such ex-
changes, it also has a strong practical and political need for state assis-
tance. Negotiations over the concrete particulars of exchange design 
have allowed Republican state officials to achieve significant conces-
sions, as Democratic federal officials get more buy-in for the program. 
Medicaid waivers have similarly involved bipartisan cooperation. 
Early developments followed a standard partisan line: Democratic-led 
states quickly agreed to expand Medicaid while Republican-led states 
resisted, and the federal executive branch initially gave blue states Med-
icaid waivers to jumpstart implementation of the law.213 More recently, 
 
210 See Metzger, supra note 24, at 1779–86.  211 Dinan, supra note 90, at 403–04, 406–08 (quoting Letter from Gary R. Herbert, Gover-
nor of Utah, to Barack H. Obama, President of the United States (Dec. 10, 2012), http:
//www.scribd.com/doc/116430186/PPACA-Fiscal-Cliff-Letter-to-the-President [https://per
ma.cc/RW27-2S92]) (internal quotation marks omitted). 212 See id. at 406; State Health Ins. Marketplace Types, 2016, Kaiser Family Found., 
http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-health-insurance-marketplace-types 
[https://perma.cc/5HW2-JEME].  213 See Rose, supra note 90, at 65–66; Thompson & Gusmano, supra note 90, at 432. 
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however, the administration has been using waivers to encourage states 
with Republican governors, or Democratic governors needing to work 
with Republican legislatures, to participate in the expansion.214 Perhaps 
most notably, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services negotiat-
ed waivers with Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, New Hampshire, 
and Pennsylvania, several of which permit Medicaid expansion through 
private insurance policies and can thus be held out as “conservative.”215 
Other waivers permit states to require copays from Medicaid beneficiar-
ies, to use healthy behavior incentives, and to exclude certain Medicaid 
benefits such as nonemergency medical transportation.216 With these 
waivers, Republican state officials win policy skirmishes while Demo-
cratic federal officials win critical state participation in Medicaid expan-
sion. If such compromises do not seem the stuff that bipartisan govern-
ance is made of, they are miles apart from the monotone discussion 
within the federal government.217  
Although the ACA is a particularly high-stakes example—in terms of 
partisan controversy, the amount of money involved, and the signifi-
 
214 The Medicaid expansion has more generally showcased intraparty divisions that were 
absent in Congress, with several Republican Governors seeking to expand Medicaid over the 
objections of their Republican legislatures. In Ohio, for instance, Governor John Kasich ne-
gotiated a premium-assistance plan with federal officials, but the legislature passed a bill 
preventing the expansion. Robert Pear, States Urged to Expand Medicaid with Private Insur-
ance, N.Y. Times (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/us/politics/states-
urged-to-expand-medicaid-with-private-insurance.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/77YU-ERE
3]. Using his line-item veto power, Governor Kasich vetoed this provision and then em-
ployed the state’s Controlling Board to approve a traditional Medicaid expansion. Thomas 
Suddes, Gov. Kasich Turns to the Controlling Board to Get Medicaid Expansion Through in 
Ohio, Cleveland.com (Oct. 13, 2013), http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2013
/10/gov_kasich_turns_to_the_contro.html [https://perma.cc/6DH9-CCZ5]; see State ex rel. 
Cleveland Right to Life v. Ohio Controlling Bd., 3 N.E.3d 185, 189–90 (Ohio 2013); Rose, 
supra note 90, at 73–74.  215 Rose, supra note 90, at 66; see also Thompson & Gusmano, supra note 90, at 433–34 
(“Republican supporters of premium assistance saw it as a market-oriented, ‘conservative’ 
alternative to the traditional ‘broken’ Medicaid program that Obamacare sought to ex-
pand.”).  
216 See MaryBeth Musumeci & Robin Rudowitz, The ACA and Medicaid Expansion 
Waivers, Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured 6, 9–12, http://kff.org/report-
section/the-aca-and-medicaid-expansion-waivers-issue-brief/ [https://perma.cc/9G5F-PKP3] 
(last updated Nov. 20, 2015).  
217 See, e.g., Russell Berman, ‘Promise Kept’: The Senate Finally Votes to Repeal 
Obamacare, Atlantic (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/th
e-senate-finally-votes-to-repeal-obamacare/418644 [https://perma.cc/XQM3-RLES] (noting 
that Republicans in the House of Representatives have voted to repeal Obamacare more than 
fifty times).  
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cance of the policy at issue—bipartisan agreements are a staple of feder-
al executive waivers more generally. A recent study found no evidence 
that shared partisan identification between a governor and the President 
increased a state’s likelihood of receiving a Medicaid waiver prior to the 
ACA.218 This makes sense insofar as waiver holds out two quite distinct 
possibilities as a tool of executive federalism: It allows the federal exec-
utive to achieve policy objectives through partisan alliances, but it also 
enables bipartisan compromise between particular state and federal ac-
tors.219 
Even this bifurcated framing is too simple. While, at a certain level of 
generality, state and federal executive priorities may be aligned or op-
posed because of partisan commitments, the very process of implemen-
tation frequently reshapes understandings of goals and interests and may 
generate coalitions or fractures that were not apparent when policies 
could be discussed in more abstract terms.220 We see this, for instance, in 
how the federal executive branch has altered its position on marijuana 
enforcement in response to state actions. It has also been a defining fea-
ture of education policymaking over the past decade. In some respects, 
the big-picture partisan story with respect to education inverts the 
healthcare story: The initial NCLB law and state Common Core initia-
tive represented rare triumphs of bipartisanship, rather than the summa 
of partisan polarization, and the implementation process then highlight-
ed intraparty dispute. At the time of NCLB’s enactment, President 
George W. Bush and Senator Ted Kennedy could agree on high-level 
values like educational excellence and equal opportunity.221 So too, the 
initial development of the Common Core standards reflected rare accord, 
with the vast majority of states signing on in the first year after the 
standards were released.222 As the federal executive branch and the states 
worked out details of education assessment, a classic partisan split de-
 
218 Shelly, supra note 88, at 455–56, 461–62, 467; see also Thompson, supra note 88, at 18 
(“Presidents have strong incentives to build supportive relationship[s] with governors of 
their own party by approving their waiver requests. But it deserves emphasis that states with 
Republican governors under Clinton and Democratic governors under Bush also succeeded 
in winning approval for their proposals.”).  219 See Metzger, supra note 24, at 1767, 1770–71.  220 See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimental-
ism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 284–85 (1998). 221 Andrew Rudalevige, The Politics of No Child Left Behind, Educ. Next, 
http://educationnext.org/the-politics-of-no-child-left-behind/ [https://perma.cc/N4HH-YMU
X]. 222 See Jochim & Lavery, supra note 140, at 380.  
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veloped, with conservative Republicans resisting what they viewed as a 
national takeover of a state domain.223 
But as the standards began to be implemented and discussions turned 
to programmatic details, diverse groups of detractors and supporters 
emerged. “[T]heoretical understandings of equity and excellence were 
replaced by a keen awareness that standards fit hand in glove with test-
ing, accountability, education spending, and student privacy.”224 Teacher 
union opposition to testing fractured the Democratic coalition, even as 
more establishment Republicans defended educational standards against 
Tea Party detractors.225 The hashing out of concrete details created new 
fissures—which made state-federal bargaining all the more necessary, 
while also reshaping the expected partisan lineups.226 Indeed, it does not 
seem too strong to suggest that executive federalism with respect to edu-
cation policy ultimately enabled legislative bipartisanship (even if the 
substance of the compromise was largely that Congress should devolve 
authority).227 
In addition to focusing on implementation, another feature facilitating 
state-federal executive negotiations is their relative opacity. Casting 
nontransparency in a positive light may be surprising. Not only is there a 
deep fear of secrecy around American government, but a lack of trans-
parency has been one of the leading criticisms of executive federalism as 
it is practiced abroad. In describing Canadian executive federalism, for 
instance, the scholar who coined the term, Professor Donald Smiley, 
listed as his first “charge[] against executive federalism” that “it contrib-
utes to undue secrecy in the conduct of the public’s business.”228 Many 
critics have echoed his complaint, and others have similarly assailed 
other nations’ executive federalism as “an exercise in horse trading be-
 
223 See Republican Nat’l Comm., Resolution Concerning Common Core Education Stand-
ards, Apr. 12, 2013  (describing the Common Core as “an inappropriate overreach to stand-
ardize and control the education of our children so they will conform to a preconceived 
‘normal’”). 224 Jochim & Lavery, supra note 140, at 399. 225 Id. at 384–400.  226 See generally Wong, supra note 145 (describing state-federal bargaining around NCLB 
waivers); supra Subsection III.B.4.  227 See supra Subsection III.B.4 (discussing the ESSA). 228 Richard Simeon & David Cameron, Intergovernmental Relations and Democracy: An 
Oxymoron if There Ever Was One?, in Canadian Federalism, supra note 4, at 278, 278 
(quoting Donald Smiley, An Outsider’s Observations of Intergovernmental Relations Among 
Consenting Adults, in Consultation or Collaboration: Intergovernmental Relations in Canada 
Today (R. Simeon ed., 1979)). 
COPYRIGHT © 2016, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION  
2016] Executive Federalism Comes to America 1007 
hind closed doors” that occurs beyond “democratic scrutiny and ac-
countability.”229 
In the United States today, however, some lack of transparency may 
be a virtue. Scholars contemplating how to foster political compromise 
in polarized times argue that discussion and negotiation must occur in 
part behind closed doors. Publicity makes politicians adhere more strict-
ly to party messages, reduces their willingness to reveal flexibility in 
their positions, and interferes with a search for zones of agreement 
through the exploration of more policy options.230 But closed-door inter-
actions can be difficult in Congress and other federal government bod-
ies. Indeed, politicians and scholars alike have credited transparency 
laws like the Government in the Sunshine Act and the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (“FACA”) with perversely undermining negotiation.231 
Most executive federalism negotiations unfold in greater privacy. As 
an initial matter, state-federal consultations are exempt from the re-
quirements of transparency laws like FACA, so state and federal offi-
cials are not under a legal obligation to treat their conversations as meet-
ings of public interest and to allow public attendance or disclose meeting 
minutes.232 More generally, executive federalism tends to occur through 
a series of conversations between particular state and federal executives. 
Such conversations are usually punctuated with publicity by one side or 
the other—whether missives intending to apply political pressure, such 
as the Utah Governor’s letter to the President about the state’s small 
business exchange,233 or publications seeking to inform the public of a 
tentative decision, such as the DOJ’s series of letters about the enforce-
ment of federal marijuana offenses.234 As a simple matter of politics, we 
might expect state and federal officials to trumpet their policy achieve-
ments. And the results of these negotiations inevitably become public as 
 
229 See, e.g., Kenneth Wiltshire, Australia’s New Federalism: Recipes for Marble Cakes, 
22 Publius 165, 167, 180 (1992) (discussing Australia). The most pronounced criticisms of 
executive federalism in these terms have concerned constitutional negotiations of the sort 
least translatable to American executive federalism.  
230 See Binder & Lee, supra note 5, at 252–53; Pildes, supra note 5, at 847–49; Warren & 
Mansbridge, supra note 5, at 106–12.  231 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2012); id. app. §§ 2–3; see Pildes, supra note 5, at 846. 232 See Miriam Seifter, States, Agencies, and Legitimacy, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 443, 470–71 
(2014).  
233 See supra note 211. 
234 See supra notes 100–106 and accompanying text. 
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policy is reshaped. But critical back-and-forths, offers and counteroffers, 
happen out of the public eye. 
By highlighting executive federalism as a forum for less transparent 
governance, I do not mean to celebrate government secrecy as such. The 
public is rightly concerned to make sure that state and federal executives 
are taking important considerations into account, not making corrupt 
deals, and the like.235 And such concerns may be, if anything, more acute 
for executive branch negotiations than their legislative counterparts. But 
we should not automatically be suspicious of confidential negotiations. 
Instead, we should think about what types of publicity may facilitate 
public oversight without unduly impeding negotiation. The American 
Political Science Association task force on negotiating agreement in pol-
itics, for instance, has suggested that “citizens should not demand trans-
parency in process, opening to the public the process of reaching [par-
ticular] decisions, but instead transparency in rationale, making the 
reasons for decisions public.”236 
To apply this or a similar standard in the executive federalism con-
text, we might begin by focusing on legal requirements that already gov-
ern this space. For instance, some acts of executive federalism unfold in 
part through notice and comment rulemaking, while others follow less 
rigorous administrative procedures.237 We should also consider how ex-
ecutive actors themselves may generate expectations of transparency. In 
the past, the federal executive branch has, unprompted, required publici-
ty for some intergovernmental negotiations. For instance, under Presi-
dent Clinton, HHS noticed Medicaid waivers in the Federal Register and 
received comments.238 Various memoranda and directives during Presi-
dent Obama’s tenure have more generally created guidelines for public 
transparency in agency action.239 The point is not that any of these prac-
 
235 See Pildes, supra note 5, at 848. 236 Mansbridge, supra note 206, at 267; see Warren & Mansbridge, supra note 5, at 108. 237 Compare, e.g., Clean Power Plan, supra note 124 (notice and comment rulemaking), 
with Cole Memo, supra note 106 (letter describing DOJ’s intentions regarding enforcement 
of the CSA).  238 See Thompson & Burke, supra note 68, at 994.  239 See, e.g., Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies from 
President Barack Obama, Re: Transparency and Open Government (Jan. 21, 2009), https://w
ww.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/TransparencyandOpenGovernment [https://perma.cc/
RH33-VQUH]; Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies from 
Peter R. Orszag, Dir., OMB, Re: Open Government Directive (Dec. 8, 2009), https://www
.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf 
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tices gets it right, but simply that there is capacity within the federal ex-
ecutive branch to furnish transparency. Those seeking to balance the 
need for private negotiations with public accountability should take ad-
vantage of the fact that executive federalism is not governed by sunshine 
laws like FACA and shape transparency requirements more delicately in 
this arena. 
C. Representation: Plurality and Deliberation Beyond Legislatures 
When scholars of political polarization consider how to foster negoti-
ation, they are almost always talking about legislatures, and their ulti-
mate concern is democratic representation. Professors Warren and 
Mansbridge write: 
[T]he legislature—the official law-giving body—has a unique and 
central role in a democracy. . . . Because Congress is composed of 
many representatives, elected from every part of the country, it . . . can 
come far closer than the executive to representing and communicating 
with the people in all of their plurality. When Congress is unable to 
act in the face of urgent collective problems, power flows to other 
parts of the political system, diminishing its democratic capacity and 
legitimacy.240  
As this suggests, scholars are likely to view legislative gridlock as a 
problem for representation precisely because it displaces political power 
onto the executive. The focus on legislatures is not incidental; democrat-
ic representation is defined in terms of legislative bodies.241 
Insofar as such accounts consider only the federal government, how-
ever, they overlook ways in which national representation may be ad-
vanced outside of Washington.242 State participation in national govern-
 
[https://perma.cc/36CK-9ABD]; see also Bagenstos, supra note 88, at 237 (discussing trans-
parency around waivers during the Obama Administration). 240 Warren & Mansbridge, supra note 5, at 87. 241 See, e.g., Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 235 (1967) (“We 
would be reluctant . . . to consider a government representative unless it included some sort 
of collegiate representative body in a more than advisory capacity.”). 242 Cf. Samuel H. Beer, Federalism, Nationalism, and Democracy in America, 72 Am. Pol. 
Sci. Rev. 9, 15 (1978) (arguing that American democracy is designed around “representa-
tional federalism” because the same electorate chooses state and federal governments, with a 
federal perspective informing state voting and a state perspective informing federal voting). 
Today, the federal system is not principally relevant to national representation because a 
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ance tempers the contrast of a multimember legislature and a singular 
executive. Because executive federalism involves state as well as federal 
actors, it is a form of executive action that is plural. And because execu-
tive federalism generates different variants of and institutional responses 
to national policy, it may spur deliberation grounded in concrete acts ra-
ther than abstract speech. To be clear, in elaborating these claims, I do 
not seek to defend executive action as superior to legislative action; a 
national legislative process has virtues that cannot be replicated by ex-
ecutive negotiations. My aim is more modest: to push back against ar-
guments that a shift to executive governance is only a problem for repre-
sentation and to highlight some ways in which this shift might involve 
distinct benefits as well as costs.243  
A first thing to note about executive federalism in this regard is that it 
disturbs the assumption that Congress is plural and the executive is uni-
tary. Given the wide variety of interests and identities in the nation, a 
multimember body should have a superior claim to reflecting the peo-
ple’s will than any unitary representative. Hence Professors Warren and 
Mansbridge’s argument that Congress comes “far closer than the execu-
tive to representing and communicating with the people in all of their 
plurality.”244 Because executive federalism involves the federal execu-
tive branch and the executives of all fifty states, however, it too incorpo-
rates many different actors. While the federal executive branch is itself a 
plural entity, executive federalism involves much more substantial di-
versity because it encompasses elected politicians who purport to speak 
for each state and both political parties.245 
 
state perspective informs congressional selection, but instead because fifty state governments 
are themselves fora for national politics. 243 The simplest way to defend executive federalism might be to abandon a legislative 
model of representation altogether. Instead of seeking multiplicity and deliberation, for in-
stance, one might privilege simple electoral accountability. Here, executives have an ad-
vantage: The President has a much higher profile than members of Congress, and Governors 
have much higher profiles than state legislators. See Christopher S. Elmendorf & David 
Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance, Political Parties, and Election Law, 2013 
U. Ill. L. Rev. 363, 418. This type of argument, however, asks both too much and too little of 
representation. Although voters pay greater attention to executives, they are by no means 
well informed. See, e.g., id. at 381. More generally, this understanding of representation 
strips it of salutary forms of complexity, as the discussion in the main text will suggest.  
244 Warren & Mansbridge, supra note 5, at 87. 245 It would be easy to oversell executive federalism as a plural arrangement. Among other 
things, all of the actors involved are executive officials. Many accounts of representation in-
sist not just on multimember bodies but on multiple sources of representation. No single in-
stitutional arrangement will suffice if multiplicity is a means of representing various “aspects 
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If this plural character makes executive federalism more similar to 
multimember bodies than one might initially assume, it is the way exec-
utive federalism most clearly departs from legislative action—in how it 
translates diverse views into policy and fosters deliberation—that may 
paradoxically lend it the strongest claim to advance democratic repre-
sentation. Because most conceptions of representation are oriented 
around legislative processes, they assume that deliberation precedes ac-
tion and ultimately yields a single accord. The disaggregated quality of 
executive federalism inverts these premises: Deliberation may follow 
from policymaking and be a matter of exploring ongoing disagreement 
rather than settling it. It is in these two respects that the plural character 
of executive federalism is most important—not because it is a satisfying 
form of multiplicity in and of itself, but because it enables a variety of 
different policy choices to be instantiated and, at least potentially, to 
spur richer governmental and public conversations. 
The practice of executive federalism suggests, first, that policy deci-
sions may be the basis for deliberation by politicians and the general 
public. Recent work defending representation (as compared to direct 
democracy, in particular) has emphasized the ways in which representa-
tives facilitate deliberation both within government and beyond it.246 On 
a legislative model of representation, deliberation is generally taken to 
precede policy. But the adoption of various policies may also commence 
or reinvigorate a deliberative process when decisions are manifold and 
iterative. State choices to expand Medicaid in particular ways have 
prompted and informed national discussions about the provision of 
healthcare, for instance, while state choices to legalize marijuana have 
changed conversations across the nation about drug policy, and the im-
plementation of the Common Core standards has reshaped discourse 
around education policy.247 
 
of a person’s life experience, identity, or activity where she . . . has affinity with others,” Iris 
Marion Young, Deferring Group Representation, in Ethnicity and Group Rights 349, 355, 
362 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., 1997) (emphasis omitted), or of making visible the 
inherently problematic nature of representation, see Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foun-
dations 183–86 (1991). To satisfy such understandings, multiplicity must be found in many 
institutions rather than within any single one. 
246 See, e.g., Nadia Urbinati, Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Delib-
eration, 28 Pol. Theory 758, 766–67 (2000). 247 On the virtues of concrete action, as compared to more abstract speech, in informing 
deliberation, see Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1745 (2005), 
and Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New Architecture 
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While any policy decision might be said to facilitate deliberation, the 
claim is a hollow one absent the prospect of a new decision. Because ex-
ecutive federalism furnishes many venues for policymaking and yields 
decisions that can be amended relatively easily, the discussions and re-
flection it spurs may contribute not only in a long-term, indirect sense to 
future policymaking, but in a more immediate sense as well. Concrete 
policies may be particularly useful in fostering dynamic relationships 
between government officials and the public. Recent work has insisted 
that representation must be understood not only as a matter of giving 
voice to preexisting constituent interests, but also of “shap[ing] and re-
shap[ing]” political interests.248 As compared to more abstract speech, 
policy choices make visible what these political interests entail and bet-
ter organize the claims elected officials make to constituents.249 
If executive federalism’s plural governance sites enable concrete de-
cisions to shape deliberation, so too do they suggest that deliberation 
need not be in the service of a single shared agreement. Legislative de-
liberation is generally understood to yield political settlement, if not 
deep consensus; even on more aggregative or contestatory conceptions, 
the legislature deliberates so as to promulgate one law.250 Because exec-
utive federalism enables multiple versions of national policy to be in-
stantiated at once, the discussions it stimulates both within government 
and beyond it may be a matter of exploring ongoing disagreement rather 
than resolving it. Deliberation may generate new interests, new coali-
tions, and new judgments of existing policies, but it need not eliminate 
difference.251 
 
of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, in Experimentalist Governance in the European 
Union: Towards a New Architecture 1, 6 (Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 2010).  248 Clarissa Rile Hayward, Making Interest: On Representation and Democratic Legitima-
cy, in Political Representation 111, 112 (Ian Shapiro et al. eds., 2009); see also, e.g., Bernard 
Manin, The Principles of Representative Government 226 (1997) (“Representatives are per-
sons who take the initiative in proposing a line of division.”); Urbinati, supra note 6, at 24 
(“[R]epresentation is not meant to make a preexisting entity—i.e., the unity of the state or 
the people or the nation—visible; rather, it is a form of political existence created by the ac-
tors themselves (the constituency and the representative).”). 
249 Cf. Urbinati, supra note 6, at 16 (arguing that representation furnishes the demos with 
an opportunity to “reflect upon itself and judge its laws, institutions, and leaders”). See gen-
erally Michael Saward, The Representative Claim, 5 Contemp. Pol. Theory 297, 299 (2006) 
(casting representation as a process of claim-making). 250 See generally Hayward, supra note 248, at 124–25 (discussing aggregative, delibera-
tive, and contestatory conceptions of democratic politics).  
251 Cf. Sabel & Zeitlin, supra note 247, at 4 (“In the EU . . . deliberative decision making is 
driven by the discussion and elaboration of persistent difference.”); cf. also Bagenstos, supra 
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Critical to accepting executive federalism as plural and deliberation-
facilitating is recognizing it as a large-scale arrangement, the legitimacy 
of which inheres not only in discrete relationships between particular 
constituents and elected officials, but also in the “over-all structure and 
functioning of the system, the patterns emerging from the multiple activ-
ities of many people.”252 Colorado’s legalization of marijuana is not, on 
this view, relevant only to residents of Colorado, nor is RGGI’s regula-
tion of emissions relevant only to residents of northeastern states. Ra-
ther, state decisions are part of national policymaking, and individuals 
may have representative relationships with political actors they are not 
eligible to vote for—or, at least, a meaningful connection to decisions 
made beyond their designated territorial districts.253 Both claims are 
plausible because of the partisan dynamics shaping executive federal-
ism. 
I have elsewhere suggested that today’s partisan politics generates a 
“federalist variant of surrogate representation.”254 Because states are key 
players in national politics, their policy decisions are often directed at, 
and have consequences for, the national public. Thus, individuals in one 
state may in some sense be represented by another state, by politicians 
with whom they have no electoral connection. Such surrogate represen-
tation may arise even when states act alone given how partisanship 
bridges the state-federal divide. But the ways in which states may con-
tribute to representing a national polity are particularly pronounced in 
the case of executive federalism because interactions among state and 
federal actors establish national policy. When the federal executive con-
siders how to respond to state education initiatives, or when Arkansas 
negotiates an exception to Medicaid, the implications for a national pub-
lic are more immediate and readily apparent than when a state regulates 
on its own. Federalist surrogate representation thus elaborates on a sug-
 
note 88, at 239 (“[A] waiver regime, honestly engaged, can provide the opportunity for polit-
ical debate, contestation, and accountability.”).  252 Pitkin, supra note 241, at 221–22.  253 See generally supra Part I. Recent political theory goes further, positing that political 
representation occurs beyond government altogether, in “a pluralistic public sphere of asso-
ciations, political movements, and opinions,” although proponents acknowledge the risks of 
such an extension. Nadia Urbinati & Mark E. Warren, The Concept of Representation in 
Contemporary Democratic Theory, 11 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 387, 406–07 (2008). 254 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 15, at 1132–34; see also Mansbridge, supra note 6, at 522–
23 (describing surrogate representation of voters by legislators with whom they have no 
electoral relationship). 
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gestion in the political theory literature that constituencies are not fixed, 
preexisting entities but are rather created by representative relationships 
and claims.255 Constituency need not be bounded by territory, on this 
view, but may have affective, ideological, and other nongeographic as-
pects. 
If this sounds fanciful, it is worth noting the extent to which surrogate 
representation is already a part of our law. Perhaps most fundamentally, 
the American system of congressional representation is principally, if 
often implicitly, defended in terms of surrogate representation. With ter-
ritorial districting and first-past-the-post elections, many voters lose in 
their districts. They are nonetheless believed to achieve representation 
within Congress because voters in other districts elect politicians who 
advance their substantive interests.256 
Recently, the Supreme Court has more explicitly embraced a form of 
surrogate representation, albeit without offering a theoretical justifica-
tion. In McCutcheon v. FEC, the Court invalided campaign finance re-
strictions that limited the number of candidates to whom an individual 
could contribute.257 Casting campaign finance questions as matters of 
political participation rather than speech alone, the Court concluded: 
“Constituents have the right to support candidates who share their views 
and concerns. Representatives are not to follow constituent orders, but 
can be expected to be cognizant of and responsive to those concerns. 
Such responsiveness is key to the very concept of self-governance 
through elected officials.”258 Curiously, however, the “constituent” in 
question was not a constituent in the classic sense: Shaun McCutcheon 
was not eligible to vote for the far-flung candidates he funded.259 Be-
cause the opinion defends his contributions in terms of representation 
but never explains why McCutcheon is properly seen as a constituent, 
 
255 See, e.g., Urbinati, supra note 6, at 24; Young, supra note 6, at 130–31; Hayward, supra 
note 248, at 112; Saward, supra note 249, at 297–98. 256 For descriptions of this practice, see Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority: Fun-
damental Fairness in Representative Democracy 130 (1994); Mansbridge, supra note 6, at 
522–25; Robert Weissberg, Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress, 72 Am. Pol. 
Sci. Rev. 535 (1978). 
257 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448–49 (2014). 258 Id. at 1462. 259 Justice John Paul Stevens, Address at the Administrative Law Section of the D.C. Bar, 
2014 Harold Leventhal Lecture: Oops! 4 (Sept. 12, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/JPS%20Speech(DC)_09-12-2014.pdf) [https://perma
.cc/2XP2-DYYZ]. 
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the Court fails to offer a theory of monetary surrogate representation to 
justify its holding. 
The most sympathetic rationale it might have offered inheres in the 
recognition that all politics today is a national, multivenue undertaking, 
and territorial districts do not fully define constituencies.260 On this log-
ic, McCutcheon has representative relationships with officials he may 
not vote for, and the Court’s decision accommodates this political reali-
ty. I do not mean, in suggesting this rationale, to defend the McCutcheon 
decision or territorial districting more generally. There are powerful ar-
guments against both.261 I do mean to argue that surrogacy is already an 
aspect of our political system and that those who reject federalist surro-
gacy likely must reject more settled approaches to democratic represen-
tation in the United States as well. Indeed, the surrogate representation 
generated by executive federalism may be more attractive than some of 
these other forms of surrogacy. While monetary constituencies interfere 
with officials’ ability to speak for their electoral constituents,262 federal-
ist surrogate representation may be ideological or affective rather than 
transactional. 
Accepting that executive federalism may facilitate national represen-
tation under certain conditions suggests that we might attend to these 
conditions before dismissing the practice outright. One obvious risk of 
executive as compared to legislative action, for instance, is that it may 
collapse into unilateralism, inhibiting pluralism and deliberation alike. I 
have suggested that the federal system moderates this possibility, but on-
ly if there is interaction and mutuality among state and federal officials. 
An important question is thus how to ensure cogovernance by state and 
federal actors so that executive federalism is not reduced to federal ex-
ecutive governance. In the next Part, I turn to some doctrines bearing on 
this issue. 
 
260 See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 15, at 1133–34. 261 See, e.g., Guinier, supra note 256, at 119–37; Richard Briffault, Of Constituents and 
Contributors, 2015 U. Chi. Legal F. 29, 33–34; Joseph Fishkin, Who Is a Constituent?, 
Balkinization (Apr. 3, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/04/who-is-constituent.html 
[https://perma.cc/B9TC-WV4E]. 
262 See Briffault, supra note 261, at 48 (offering evidence that politicians are responsive to 
their contributors at the expense of their electoral constituents). 
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V. DOCTRINAL INVERSIONS 
If executive federalism is shaping much domestic policy and this may 
be a salutary development, as I have argued, a critical question I have 
thus far bracketed is the extent to which courts will constrain the prac-
tice. Already, plaintiffs are contending that the Clean Power Plan ex-
ceeds the EPA’s authority, that Colorado’s legalization of marijuana is 
preempted, and that the Common Core testing consortia are unconstitu-
tional interstate compacts. More lawsuits are sure to come. 
Our doctrine is ill-equipped to deal with these challenges because it 
begins from the premise of legislative federalism. In considering ques-
tions ranging from Chevron deference for federal agency decisions to 
the validity of interstate agreements under the Compact Clause, courts 
assume that Congress is deciding how to reconcile state and federal au-
thority. If legislative federalism is no longer our federalism, however, 
we need to think differently about constitutional and administrative law. 
In particular, we might shift from principal-agent models of delegation 
and accountability to less hierarchical, more polyarchic understandings. 
Instead of fearing principal-less agents running amok, courts might 
come to see many interconnected and mutually reliant state and federal 
actors. 
The arguments I advance here, and the practice of executive federal-
ism more generally, potentially implicate many doctrines, including the 
limits of the President’s enforcement discretion, the anticommandeering 
rule, the dormant Commerce Clause, the equal sovereignty principle, 
and separation of powers at the state level. I focus in this Part on the 
questions of Chevron deference, preemption, and the Compact Clause 
that underlie leading contemporary challenges. In each area, I suggest 
that a doctrinal inversion is warranted: Federalism might be a basis for 
enhanced, not diminished, deference to federal agencies; courts might 
recognize executive non-preemption of state law; and federal executive 
involvement in interstate agreements might make courts look more, not 
less, favorably on these agreements. 
A. Deference-Enhancing Federalism 
A contentious administrative law question today concerns how much 
deference agencies should receive when they engage in significant poli-
cymaking in the absence of congressional instruction. In broad strokes, 
this is simply the question of Chevron deference. The Supreme Court 
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recognized in 1984 (if not long before) that agencies have a role to play 
when statutes fail to address particular issues, when they are vague or 
ambiguous, or when they endure as circumstances change.263 While most 
renditions of Chevron deference assume interstitial statutory gaps, how-
ever, partisan polarization and congressional gridlock instead leave gap-
ing holes.264 Courts may be inclined to withhold deference in such cir-
cumstances—especially when agency decision making implicates state 
interests.265 Yet federalism, in the particular form of state-federal cogov-
ernance, should instead be understood to offer a basis for judicial defer-
ence. 
Because the reigning model of agency legitimacy is legislative, courts 
reviewing agency policymaking in the face of substantial statutory gaps 
or an awkward fit between an old statute and a new question may be-
lieve no deference is warranted. Indeed, some recent statements in Su-
preme Court opinions suggest a general wariness about agencies making 
significant policy decisions, whether cast doctrinally as a matter of rea-
sonableness or the major questions exception. Considering an EPA in-
terpretation of the Clean Air Act, for instance, the Court found the agen-
cy’s position “unreasonable because it would bring about an enormous 
and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without 
clear congressional authorization.”266 And even as the Court ultimately 
agreed with the IRS’s interpretation of the Affordable Care Act—setting 
the case apart from precedents in which it withheld deference because it 
 
263 Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Against the opinion’s 
reception, its author, Justice Stevens, insists that it was not a watershed decision but rather a 
reflection of existing doctrine. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The 
Making of an Accidental Landmark, in Administrative Law Stories 399, 420–21 (Peter L. 
Strauss ed., 2006). 
264 See, e.g., Freeman & Spence, supra note 9, at 63 (“[C]ourts are likely to face an in-
creasing number of cases in which they must decide the legality of agency policy decisions 
on issues not foreseen by Congress when it enacted the agency’s enabling legislation.”). 265 See generally Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 
(2001) (rejecting an agency interpretation that would have raised “federalism questions”); 
Gersen, supra note 8, at 203. 266 Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014). But cf. EPA v. EME 
Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1610 (2014) (holding, given ambiguity in the 
Clean Air Act, that “EPA’s cost-effective allocation of emission reductions among upwind 
States . . . is a permissible, workable, and equitable interpretation of the Good Neighbor Pro-
vision”). 
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disagreed with an agency’s view267—it determined that the question of 
whether tax credits are available on federal exchanges was too important 
to commit to an administrative agency.268 
Citing legislative gridlock, some scholars have argued that there are, 
to the contrary, strong arguments for granting particular deference to 
agencies when they are addressing novel problems in polarized times.269 
With an unclear mandate from the enacting Congress and little prospect 
of intervention from the current Congress, a lack of deference means 
that courts themselves will be engaging in policymaking, and Chevron’s 
emphasis on democratic accountability and expertise suggest, for many, 
why this role should fall instead to agencies. In keeping with the Chev-
ron opinion itself, however, scholars have offered two very different ra-
tionales for deference. Professors Jody Freeman and David Spence, for 
instance, focus on the democratic accountability and political respon-
siveness of federal agencies, and argue that “[t]he case for deference 
seems especially strong when agencies seek to address problems unfore-
seen by the enacting Congress.”270 
Others advance a view of agencies as expert bodies insulated from 
political forces. Professor Cass Sunstein, for example, defends deference 
in polarized times with reference to agencies’ technocratic approach to 
factual determinations. He argues that agencies should have “the au-
thority to adapt statutory terms to new or unanticipated circumstances, 
even when the interpretation fits awkwardly with the apparent meaning 
of the text,” because such deference takes decision making out of poli-
tics in the “simple or crude sense” and instead privileges attention to 
facts.271 This argument inverts the democratically-accountable-agencies 
 
267 See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (declining 
to defer to the Food and Drug Administration’s assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco prod-
ucts).  268 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015). Although the Court may have eschewed 
deference because it regarded the particular agency involved, the IRS, as nonexpert with re-
spect to health insurance policy, the Court held this out as an additional reason to withhold 
deference beyond the question’s “deep ‘economic and political significance.’” Id. A broader-
based skepticism of agency decision making has also appeared in other recent decisions. See, 
e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706–11 (2015). 
269 Freeman & Spence, supra note 9; Sunstein, supra note 9. 
270 Freeman & Spence, supra note 9, at 76, 81. 271 Sunstein, supra note 9, at 15–17; see also id. at 19 (advocating a “receptive approach to 
the Chevron principle, allowing adaptations (not violations) of statutory text to changing 
values and circumstances”). 
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approach: Deference here follows from agencies’ difference from politi-
cal actors. 
Professor Sunstein’s argument is somewhat curious, however, in its 
faith in apolitical factual determinations. Just a few pages prior to ad-
vancing this normative claim, he reviews extensive evidence of “party-
ism,” including the way it distorts our ability to process facts.272 Not on-
ly do people apply a partisan filter to value judgments and facts alike, 
but we are also unaware we are doing so.273 Although certain judgments 
are less charged than others, partyism calls into question the ability of 
administrative agencies to reach factual conclusions in ways divorced 
from “politics.” The point is not that agencies are unduly politicized or 
that officials intend to make political decisions, but only that agency of-
ficials are human like the rest of us. While there may be a subset of fac-
tual determinations that is truly apolitical in the way Professor Sunstein 
means, the social science evidence he cites suggests this is a small sub-
set, and the big questions agencies face—about environmental regula-
tion, social welfare, and the like—are unlikely to fall within it.274   
Instead of insisting on agencies’ technical expertise or democratic ac-
countability in isolation, we might more forthrightly acknowledge the 
significance of partisanship and respond by “tailor[ing] deference to va-
riety”275: federal agencies might receive deference to the extent their ac-
tions incorporate state governance and thus build multiplicity into feder-
al law. Most ambitiously, one could suggest parties be directly folded 
into the inquiry—for instance, a Democratic federal administration 
would receive greater deference insofar as it embarked on a project of 
cogovernance with Republican-led states and vice versa. It is, however, 
hard to imagine courts expressly embracing this kind of inquiry. A more 
general focus on state-federal integration could be a useful proxy, while 
also respecting additional federalism values. In particular, courts might 
grant greater deference to federal agencies when they furnish states a 
 
272 E.g., id. at 10. Partyism stands for the idea that identifying with a political party leads 
us to be hostile to members of the opposing party. Id. at 1–2. 
273 See also, e.g., Carlee Beth Hawkins & Brian A. Nosek, Motivated Independence? Im-
plicit Party Identity Predicts Political Judgments Among Self-Proclaimed Independents, 38 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1437, 1438 (2012) (finding that individuals who identified 
as Independents nonetheless implicitly identified either with Republicans or with Democrats 
and preferred policies purportedly proposed by the party with which they identified). 274 See Sunstein, supra note 9 at 13–15. 275 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001). Of course, I mean something 
different by this phrase than the Court did in Mead. 
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role in setting and administering national policy going forward. While 
necessarily fuzzy at the margins, this standard would at least apply to a 
federal agency’s incorporation of existing state policy and a federal 
agency’s decision to confer flexible implementation authority on the 
states. 
For some, the suggestion that federalism, in the form of state-federal 
cogovernance, should be deference-enhancing will seem perverse. As 
the Clean Power Plan litigation demonstrates, state actors may regard 
their inclusion in a federal administrative scheme as a red flag that a 
federal agency is encroaching on a state domain. Or they may under-
stand state-federal cooperation as a suspect form of horizontal aggran-
dizement.276 Indeed, given partisan politics in particular, states are likely 
to take opposing positions on nearly all of the legal, as well as policy, 
questions raised by practices of executive federalism. As this under-
scores, the intersection of Chevron and federalism has both an adminis-
trative law dimension and a more classic federalism dimension. In prior 
work, Professor Heather Gerken and I have attempted to challenge some 
assumptions about state versus federal power that underlie the federal-
ism debate.277 While the classic view is that federal programs relying on 
state administration displace the states, integration may in fact be a 
source of state power. What appears to be federal aggrandizement fre-
quently opens new avenues for states to contest federal decisions and set 
a national agenda. 
More pertinent here, the traditional federalism premise that cogovern-
ance is disempowering for states also informs Chevron doctrine: Current 
doctrine suggests that the only way federalism may enter the Chevron 
inquiry is to defeat an agency’s claim to deference. This position is 
closely related to assumptions about legislative federalism. Because 
many judges and scholars see Congress as the proper arbiter of state-
federal relations, they believe agency decisions implicating state inter-
ests should be removed from the Chevron framework altogether or re-
ceive diminished deference.278 Even those who defend federal agencies 
 
276 See Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judi-
cial Review, 51 Duke L.J. 75, 117–28 (2001). 
277 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 Yale 
L.J. 1256 (2009). 278 See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172–74 
(2001); Gersen, supra note 8, at 232–33. See generally Metzger, supra note 8, at 2071, 2104–
05 (citing cases showing that federalism concerns can be addressed at step zero, step one, or 
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insist merely that Chevron’s usual application should not be affected by 
federalism concerns; they do not suggest that states have a role to play in 
legitimating judicial deference.279 Like much of the federalism literature, 
the current approach to Chevron thus understands questions of state ver-
sus federal authority as straightforward and static: Once the federal gov-
ernment enters a space, it is necessarily empowered and the states dis-
empowered. As I have tried to suggest, however, the ongoing process of 
cogovernance complicates these assumptions. Negotiation and bargain-
ing, cooperation and contestation, force a reevaluation of state and fed-
eral interests. 
These forward-looking aspects of executive federalism are the basis 
for suggesting that state-federal cogovernance merits judicial respect. 
Building the states into federal regulation may enhance both administra-
tive expertise and democratic accountability, the underpinnings of Chev-
ron deference that do not sound in congressional intent as such.280 For 
 
step two, but suggesting courts might subject “agency decisions that burden state interests to 
greater substantive scrutiny than usually applied” through arbitrary and capricious review). 279 See, e.g., Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 65; cf. Seifter, supra note 65 (arguing against 
a federalism step zero). 280 One might even argue that cogovernance accords with the implicit delegation under-
pinning of Chevron. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
159 (2000) (noting that deference “is premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity con-
stitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps”). In-
sofar as the implicit delegation logic is a question of what-would-Congress-do rather than 
what-did-Congress-do, believing that Congress would seek to have states and the federal ex-
ecutive together administer federal law may well be better grounded in empirics than as-
sumptions courts are frequently willing to make about congressional intent: When Congress 
legislates in times of divided government, it tends to split implementation authority among 
actors, including states and the federal government. See, e.g., David Epstein & Sharyn 
O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making 
Under Separate Powers 156–57 (1999); see also Sean Farhang & Miranda Yaver, Divided 
Government and the Fragmentation of American Law, 60 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 1 (2015) (finding 
that, under conditions of divided government, Congress is likely to divide policy implemen-
tation authority among a variety of actors and institutions). Although this sort of rationale 
may better accord with existing doctrine, I do not pursue it in the text because it follows 
from premises of legislative federalism I believe we need to move beyond. 
 It also bears mention that, insofar as executive federalism advances multiplicity rather than 
uniformity, federalism-based deference runs contrary to an understanding of Chevron that 
has appeared in the commentary: deference as a device to facilitate national uniformity in 
federal administrative law. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Im-
plications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 
87 Colum. L. Rev. 1093, 1121 (1987) (arguing that Chevron deference usefully commits 
ambiguous statutory provisions to a single agency’s interpretation rather than potentially di-
vergent interpretations of multiple circuit courts).  
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example, discussions of expertise often treat it as a capacity that is pos-
sessed rather than one that develops over time. As the experimentalism 
literature describes, however, uncertainty pervades most policymaking 
today. Especially as one moves from broad political commitments to 
programmatic details, expertise emerges from experience, and from di-
versified experience in particular.281 Incorporating states into national 
governance may be expertise-enhancing not because states are experts in 
the first instance, but rather because their participation fosters differenti-
ation and reciprocal learning. 
Perhaps more important given a backdrop of congressional gridlock, 
executive federalism suggests that democratic accountability may be fur-
thered through agency action in a more robust way than simple presiden-
tial direction. While existing justifications of federal agencies as politi-
cally responsive actors cite presidential supervision,282 this is too narrow 
a focus. In a time of political polarization, especially, overlap and inte-
gration are more likely to generate meaningful oversight by other offi-
cials and ultimate responsiveness to the public.283 State-federal integra-
tion means that instead of the thin democratic accountability of a 
President directing agency action on behalf of a national constituency, a 
variety of state and federal officials act on behalf of overlapping national 
constituencies. If courts seem increasingly wont, given legislative grid-
lock, to see agents attempting to govern without principals, they might 
instead recognize administration by many mutually dependent, demo-
cratically responsive actors.284 
 
281 See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 220, at 354–55; Sabel & Simon, supra note 145, at 
78–79; see also Gersen, supra note 8, at 213 (“Agency expertise is neither static nor exoge-
nous, but rather is a function of existing institutional arrangements.”). 282 E.g., Freeman & Spence, supra note 9, at 81 (“[P]residents direct [agencies] in response 
to demands from a national constituency.”). 283 See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 277, at 1289–91; cf. Anne Joseph O’Connell, 
Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 841, 924–26 (2014) (suggesting that 
boundary organizations—including those at the border between the federal government and 
the states—might lead us to rethink traditional rationales for deference, including by concep-
tualizing accountability in terms of multiple actors). 284 Cf. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Re-
dux, 125 Yale L.J. 104, 159–60 (2015) (arguing that both Congress and the federal executive 
should be understood as principals with respect to immigration enforcement). See generally 
Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Camelot: Rethinking Politics and Law for the Modern State 48, 
50 (2005) (proposing replacing our three-branch metaphor for government with a nonhierar-
chical network metaphor that “portrays modern government as a complex apparatus, where 
commands can come from multiple sources”). 
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In this sense, executive federalism offers a way to think about admin-
istrative legitimacy that acknowledges contemporary political realities 
but does not abandon longstanding commitments to both democratic ac-
countability and reasoned decision making. Professor Thomas Merrill 
has recently argued that the rise of executive power and, in particular, 
the ways in which “administrative governance is increasingly outrunning 
legislative authorization” are leading scholars to reconceptualize admin-
istrative legitimacy exclusively in terms of process, leaving behind a 
positivist tradition grounded in legislative authorization of agency ac-
tion.285 While embracing executive federalism also necessitates a depar-
ture from this positivist tradition, the practice cannot be justified in 
terms of process values alone. Instead, federalism becomes a critical as-
pect of executive policymaking: Recognizing national administration as 
a project of cogovernance by state as well as federal actors is what may, 
in an age of executive power, “meaningfully preserve the understanding 
that we live under a republican form of government subject to checks 
and balances.”286 
B. Executive Nonpreemption 
The most sustained focus of the federalism Chevron literature has 
concerned preemption: When and how may federal agencies preempt 
state law? Unsurprisingly, courts and scholars have offered various an-
swers. Some suggest Chevron deference, others varieties of Skidmore 
deference and still others no deference or a modicum of deference only 
for particularly subsidiary conclusions rather than the preemption deter-
mination itself.287 As with federalism and Chevron generally, however, 
amid such disagreement, commentators have widely assumed that the 
 
285 Merrill, supra note 30, at 1958; see id. at 1977 (noting that scholars are seeking “to le-
gitimize the exercise of unilateral presidential power by invoking the norms of the process 
tradition”).  286 Id. at 1978. 287 Compare, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577 (2009) (Skidmore deference), with 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996) (“substantially informed”); see also Galle 
& Seidenfeld, supra note 65, at 2001 (“an amalgam of Skidmore and hard look review”); 
Mendelson, supra note 8, at 742 (Skidmore); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institu-
tional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 727, 774–76 (2008) (deference only for subsidiary con-
clusions); Sharkey, supra note 65, at 2180 (Skidmore); Young, supra note 8, at 870–71 
(Chevron deference for an agency’s substantive interpretations of a statute but not for con-
clusions about its preemptive effect). See generally Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 
(1944) (courts give only weak deference to the decisions of administrative agencies). 
COPYRIGHT © 2016, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION  
1024 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 102:953 
preemption question comes in only one form: whether executive deci-
sions may preempt state law. 
A focus on executive federalism suggests we should be asking a dif-
ferent question: May the executive branch insulate state action from 
preemption? The federal executive may seek to preserve state govern-
ance as well as to displace it, and this provides an opportunity for state-
federal interaction to follow from state initiative. The Supreme Court 
has recognized that a federal agency’s position that state law is not 
preempted “should make a difference,” although the Court has further 
stated that an agency’s pro- and anti-preemption positions merit equal 
deference.288 
The practice of executive federalism suggests instead that federal 
agencies should receive particular deference for their determinations that 
state law is not preempted.289 While deference to a federal agency’s view 
that state law is preempted will displace state law and thus tend to yield 
unilateral federal governance, deference to a federal agency’s view that 
state law is not preempted will instead mean that state and federal regu-
lation coexist.290 Because integration is key to executive federalism’s le-
gitimate practice, courts should be more accommodating of federal ex-
ecutive determinations that state law is not preempted than that it is. 
To make this more concrete, consider the lawsuit filed by Nebraska 
and Oklahoma contending that Colorado’s regulatory regime legalizing 
marijuana is preempted by the CSA.291 The preemption argument is rela-
 
288 Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., 562 U.S. 323, 335 (2011) (citing Geier v. Am. 
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000), in which the executive branch argued for 
preemption).  289 Such deference broadly accords with the presumption against preemption. See, e.g., 
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). When an agency seeks to 
preempt state law, tension arises between the presumption against preemption and adminis-
trative deference doctrines. But when an agency seeks to preserve state law, the presumption 
against preemption and deference to agency interpretation cut the same way. Indeed, not-
withstanding the symmetry proposed in Williamson, the Court has been more likely to agree 
with the Office of the Solicitor General when it opposes federal preemption than when it ar-
gues in favor of preemption, although the Court has agreed with the Solicitor General in a 
high percentage of both types of cases. See Michael Greve et al., Preemption in the 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts: An Empirical Analysis, 22–25 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. 
for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 15-6, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.c
fm?abstract_id=2567878 [https://perma.cc/2XXG-RPEZ]. 290 Cf. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 277, at 1302–07 (discussing the practical im-
plications of federal preemption doctrine). 
291 Motion for Leave to File Complaint, Complaint, and Brief in Support at 8, Nebraska v. 
Colorado, 135 S. Ct. 2070 (2014) (No. 144), 2014 WL 7474136, at *8.  
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tively weak in any event.292 But the view of the federal executive that 
Colorado’s regulatory regime is not preempted should matter. It is the 
federal executive’s accommodation of a distinctive state policy that has 
provided the basis for negotiation and mutual accommodation. While 
federal preemption of state law would squelch the benefits of govern-
ance, compromise, and representation that follow from state-federal in-
tegration and overlap, the coexistence of state and federal regimes ad-
vances these ends.  
C. Interstate Compacts and the Separation of Powers 
Because relationships among states are an important force shaping na-
tional policy and state-federal negotiations, the future of executive fed-
eralism also depends in part on how courts receive interstate agreements. 
The Supreme Court has generously licensed multistate collaboration, but 
the integration of state and federal action that underlies executive feder-
alism reveals new doctrinal fault lines. In particular, it destabilizes the 
idea of a unified federal government and suggests that future litigation 
about interstate compacts will not concern state versus federal authority 
so much as the respective roles of Congress and the executive branch in 
brokering interstate relations. 
Compact Clause doctrine focuses on safeguarding federal supremacy. 
Most notably, a unified conception of federal supremacy underlies the 
Supreme Court’s understanding of when an interstate agreement requires 
the federal government’s approval. Although the text of the Compact 
Clause would seem to require consent for any interstate agreement—
“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any 
Agreement or Compact with another State”293—the Court has long held 
that consent is required only when an interstate agreement would aug-
 
292 The CSA contains a strongly worded savings clause, and a state’s legalization of mari-
juana as a matter of state law does not prohibit individuals from complying with the federal 
prohibition. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012). Moreover, reading federal law to require states to crim-
inalize marijuana would likely run afoul of the prohibition on commandeering. See generally 
Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. 
Rev. 74, 102–03 (2015) (describing the effect of the anticommandeering doctrine on 
preemption questions); Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana 
and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1421 (2009) 
(arguing that the states have broad power to legalize conduct prohibited by the federal gov-
ernment).  293 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. 
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ment state power at the federal government’s expense.294 Embracing 
“modes of interstate cooperation that do not enhance state power to the 
detriment of federal supremacy,” the Court has stated that the test for 
whether consent is required “is whether the Compact enhances state 
power quoad the National Government.”295 Without elaborating the 
meaning of federal supremacy, the Court has distinguished it from fed-
eral interests, noting that “every state cooperative action touching inter-
state or foreign commerce implicates some federal interest.”296 
The Court has never determined what federal approval must look like 
when it is required, but historical practice has glossed “the Consent of 
Congress” to refer to Congress “acting in the way in which Congress or-
dinarily enacts legislation—i.e., subject to presentment [and] veto.”297 
For instance, Congress acquiesced to President Franklin Delano Roose-
velt’s vetoes of two resolutions of congressional consent based on his 
view that the interstate compacts at issue impinged upon federal authori-
ty.298 Today, commentators generally assume that interstate agreements 
 
294 See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893). Looking to the “object of the 
constitutional provision,” the Court reasoned in 1893 that “the prohibition is directed to the 
formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which 
may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.” Id. Nearly one 
hundred years later, the Court reaffirmed this interpretation. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate 
Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 473 (1978). 
295 U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 460, 473; see also New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 
363, 369 (1976) (adopting Virginia v. Tennessee Compact Clause test). 296 U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 480 n.33. 297 Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent, 68 Mo. L. Rev. 285, 
319 n.138 (2003) (emphasis omitted); cf. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting 
Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2015) (“[T]he meaning of the word ‘legislature,’ used sev-
eral times in the Federal Constitution, differs according to the connection in which it is em-
ployed, depend[ent] upon the character of the function which that body in each instance is 
called upon to exercise. . . . Thus ‘the Legislature’ comprises the referendum and the Gover-
nor’s veto in the context of regulating congressional elections.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
298 See Gregory Harness, Presidential Vetoes, 1789-1988, 315, 351–52 (1992), 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/presvetoes17891988.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5
L7-NS53] (discussing President Roosevelt’s veto of S.J. Res. 139, 76th Cong. (1939) and 
H.R. 5945, 77th Cong. (1942) and noting that the veto for H.R. 5945 was unchallenged); 
Linda Hein, FDR Vetoes Republican River Compact, McCook Gazette (Oct. 12, 2001), 
http://www.mccookgazette.com/story/1046711.html [https://perma.cc/398T-JSMN]. See 
generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of 
Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411 (2012) (considering the role of historical practice in deter-
mining the scope of presidential and congressional constitutional authority).  
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requiring federal consent are subject to the President’s approval as well 
as Congress’s.299 
Doctrine and practice alike have thus framed Compact Clause ques-
tions in terms of state versus federal authority. But partisan dynamics 
have rendered any neat distinction between state and federal authority 
unstable. Divisions within each level of government and alliances across 
the state-federal divide suggest that future Compact Clause litigation 
will instead raise separation of powers questions, focusing on the rela-
tive authority of Congress and the federal executive branch. 
Two forms of this challenge are already emerging. First, in an attempt 
to effectively repeal existing federal law without presentment, certain 
state and federal officials have proposed interstate compacts in areas in-
cluding healthcare and immigration.300 Because these compacts would 
alter federal law, proponents concede that they implicate federal su-
premacy and require congressional consent, but they further insist that 
such consent should not be understood to include a role for the Presi-
dent. Indeed, compacts are attractive to such proponents precisely inso-
far as they would marshal the power of a (Republican) Congress to 
thwart the policies of a (Democratic) President.301 Although these com-
pacts appear to be political nonstarters even with a Republican majority 
in Congress, such campaigns underscore how a view of state versus fed-
 
299 See, e.g., Frederick L. Zimmermann & Mitchell Wendell, The Interstate Compact Since 
1925, at 94 (1951) (“[W]hatever the original meaning of the consent requirement may have 
been with regard to compacts, settled usage now has definitely established the President’s 
power to participate in the consent process.”); Greve, supra note 297, at 319 n.138; Note, 
Charting No Man’s Land: Applying Jurisdictional and Choice of Law Doctrines to Interstate 
Compacts, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1991, 1993 (1998). 300 Am. Legislative Exch. Council, Health Care Compact Act: Model Legislation (Oct. 13, 
2011), https://www.alec.org/model-policy/health-care-compact-act-2/ [https://perma.cc/SS
5J-FGQQ]; see Robert F. Graboyes & Matthew Mitchell, Laboratories of Autocracy, U.S. 
News (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/policy-dose/2015/10/13/hea
lth-care-compact-states-choose-autocracy-over-democracy [https://perma.cc/MHC6-QS8Z]; 
Terrence Stutz, Texas Senate Votes for Interstate Compact to Enforce Federal Immigration 
Laws, Dall. Morning News (May 7, 2015), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/state/head
lines/20150506-senate-votes-to-enforce-federal-immigration-laws-with-interstate-comp
act1.ece [https://perma.cc/42LF-MY3K]. 301 See, e.g., Mary Huls, A Constitutional Approach to Employ the Use of Interstate Com-
pacts to Address Illegal Immigration and Border Security at the State Government Level, 
Clear Lake Tea Party (Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.clearlaketeaparty.com/a_constituio
nal_approach_to_employ_the_use_of_interstate_compacts_to_address_illegal_immigration_
and_border_security_at_the_state_government_level [https://perma.cc/ZB7X-E35F] (“With 
President Obama bypassing Congress on immigration and border security issues, it only 
seems fair that a partial solution would be one that bypasses the President.”). 
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eral authority as such does not capture the most relevant divides. If Con-
gress were to approve, the fight would concern the separation of powers 
more than federalism.302 
That same reframing also animates a second novel form of Compact 
Clause argument: a challenge that a particular interstate agreement is in-
valid without congressional consent precisely because the federal execu-
tive played a role in its creation. Such a claim underlies a recent excep-
tion to the mantra that “no court, at any level, has ever found an 
interstate agreement lacking congressional approval to encroach on fed-
eral supremacy.”303 Recently, a Missouri court found that the Smarter 
Balanced Assessment Consortium was “an unlawful interstate compact 
to which the U.S. Congress has never consented [and] whose existence 
and operation violate the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution.”304 
Although that case has since been deemed moot based on a state appro-
priations law,305 similar challenges have cropped up in other states,306 
and variants of the plaintiffs’ argument are likely to recur. 
The main argument in these cases is convoluted, but it may be sum-
marized as follows: Smarter Balanced is an interstate compact that 
threatens federal supremacy because Congress has provided that the De-
partment of Education may not control state educational policy and yet 
the Department conditioned federal grants on state participation in as-
sessment consortia.307 In other words, the plaintiffs insist that the acts of 
one part of the federal government (the executive branch) undermine 
federal authority (as reposed in Congress), and they see federal execu-
 
302 See, e.g., Andrew L. Nolan, Cong. Research Serv., Interstate Compacts and Presidential 
Presentment of Congressional Consent (2015) (stating that the proposed Health Care Com-
pact would require presidential presentment). 303 Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 741, 766 (2010); 
see also, e.g., Greve, supra note 297, at 289.  304 Judgment at 1, Sauer v. Nixon (Mo. Cir. Ct. Feb. 24, 2015), No. 14AC-CC00477, 2015 
WL 4474833 at *1. 
305 Sauer v. Nixon, 474 S.W.3d. 624, 630 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). 306 See Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Preliminary and Permanent Injunction at 2, Re-
gan v. Otter (D. Idaho Sept. 29, 2015) (No. 4:15-cv-00455-BLW), http://idahoednews.wpen
gine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Common-CoreSBAC-complaint.pdf [htt
ps://perma.cc/YVU7-Q3NC]; Mike Nowatzki, Judge Hears Arguments in Lawsuit Over 
Common Core Tests in N.D., Grand Forks Herald (July 27, 2015), http://www.grandfork
sherald.com/news/crime-and-courts/3805560-judge-hears-arguments-lawsuit-over-common-
core-tests-nd [https://perma.cc/V6YC-4QLU]. 
307 See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 
16–17, Sauer v. Nixon (Mo. Cir. Ct. Feb. 24, 2015), No. 14AC-CC00477; Complaint for 
Declaratory Relief, Preliminary and Permanent Injunction, supra note 306, at 9–10. 
COPYRIGHT © 2016, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION  
2016] Executive Federalism Comes to America 1029 
tive “instigation” of interstate cooperation as rendering suspect such co-
operation.308 As this suggests, the plaintiffs are not actually advancing an 
argument about the Compact Clause; their claim is that the federal exec-
utive branch is violating federal law. The cases nonetheless offer a 
quirky illustration of a pervasive point: The Supreme Court’s traditional 
treatment of “federal supremacy” and “the National Government” as co-
herent categories is no match for today’s politics. 
As courts are increasingly asked to consider the distinct roles of vari-
ous federal government actors, they might take federal executive in-
volvement with an interstate agreement to be a source of reassurance. As 
an initial matter, if the federal executive and a state enter into an agree-
ment with one another, this sort of state-federal compact should not re-
quire express congressional approval at all.309 More generally, even 
when the federal executive does not enter into an agreement, it may 
“prompt, react to, rely on, or take advantage of an interstate agree-
ment”310 in the way that EPA has done with RGGI or that the Depart-
ment of Education did with the Common Core and the assessment con-
sortia. Under current doctrine, such executive involvement is irrelevant: 
If the interstate agreement interferes with federal supremacy, congres-
sional consent will be required, and if it does not, it is immaterial wheth-
er the federal executive branch condones or condemns it. Given the 
vague contours of “federal supremacy,” however, it will not always be 
clear whether an interstate compact has implications for federal suprem-
acy. And even as courts have broadly blessed interstate agreements in 
the absence of federal approval, federal awareness of and interaction 
with such interstate agreements may be salutary. In these intermediate 
 
308  Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, Sauer v. 
Nixon (Mo. Cir. Ct. Feb. 24, 2015), No. 14AC-CC00477. 309 See Applicability of Compact Clause to Use of Multiple State Entities Under the Water 
Resources Planning Act, 4B Op. O.L.C. 828, 830 (1980), 1980 WL 20996 [hereinafter Ap-
plicability of Compact Clause] (“[T]he Compact Clause, by prohibiting unconsented agree-
ments with other states or with foreign powers, at least by negative implication contemplates 
that federal-state agreements need not be submitted for consent. . . . It would also run counter 
to the fundamental constitutional principle of separation of powers to give either house of 
Congress the equivalent of a veto over agreements concluded by an executive branch agen-
cy.”). This is not to suggest the federal executive branch has carte blanche to enter into such 
agreements. But the relevant legal question in such cases will be whether the federal execu-
tive is operating within its lawful authority in the first instance, not whether Congress has 
agreed to a particular state-federal concordat on the back end.  
310 Brief of Appellants at 33, Sauer v. Nixon (Mo. Ct. App. May 26, 2015) (WD 78430), 
2015 WL 3615028. 
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spaces, courts might give states more leeway to enter into interstate 
agreements insofar as the federal executive branch is prompting or rely-
ing on their actions—in particular, insofar as the federal executive is in-
corporating such state action into federal governance. 
This suggestion parallels the arguments above for granting the federal 
executive branch greater deference when it brings states into federal 
regulation.311 Just as the more top-down approach to executive federal-
ism yields cooperation, contestation, and negotiation, so too may the 
more bottom-up variant of executive federalism that comes from state 
initiative yield these benefits. On this view, the federal executive’s in-
volvement with interstate agreements serves not so much to “protect the 
federal interest”312 as to provide a basis for ascertaining and reconsider-
ing state and federal interests. If interaction and overlap are part of the 
legitimate practice of executive federalism, the federal executive’s en-
gagement, even in informal ways, with interstate collaboration should 
not render these agreements suspect but rather should help to validate 
them. 
CONCLUSION 
Executive federalism has come to America, upsetting assumptions 
about federalism and the separation of powers alike. Today, alliances 
across levels of government rival those within each level, and intergov-
ernmental executive negotiations establish national policy. The judiciary 
is being asked to invalidate key practices of executive federalism, but 
courts should permit these practices insofar as they entail state-federal 
cogovernance. Because the party system undergirds its rise, executive 
federalism is a form of policymaking potentially well suited to today’s 
polarized politics. Although it poses new challenges for democratic rep-
resentation, it may yield deliberation among government officials and 
the broader public grounded in concrete decisions. By facilitating state-
differentiated national policy, it may enable partisan differences to be 
expressed concretely instead of grinding government to a halt. And by 
fostering bilateral, iterative, and relatively nontransparent interactions, it 
may open paths to compromise that seem out of reach in today’s Con-
gress. 
 
311 See supra Section V.A. 312 Applicability of Compact Clause, supra note 309, at 830. 
